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Abstract 
 
This thesis applies Zizek’s theory of the parallax gap to the text of James Joyce’s 
Ulysses. I’ve found I’m not the first to examine the function of parallax in Ulysses, or to 
apply Zizek to Joyce. I do, however, combine these materials differently and take a 
different approach. My work explores how psychoanalysis and ontology reveal a 
parallax gap in the self and in being. The very attempt to fill the parallax gap constitutes 
the endless renewal of subjectivity.   
 The self-alienation constitutive of subjectivity arises initially from an 
ontological impasse, the bookended pre-natal, post-mortem exclusion from being. Thus 
it seems that something immaterial (the life force) springs from a combination of matter 
and immateriality, ‘thrown’ into the world from nothing and nowhere. This ‘immaterial 
something’ is posited in Christian thought as the soul; in Zizek’s work, it is the life-
substance of jouissance. Jouissance is the inextricable pleasure-in-pain by which the 
subject continually seeks to transcend its internal and external limitations, and thus, to 
keep desiring. These limitations are immanent, thus each character must confront the 
internal impasse in himself in order to confront it in the world.  
 The parallax gap creates a sort of bend in the fabric of being, a traumatic 
emptiness which derails one from fulfilling desire. The very aim for failure ensures that 
one keeps desiring: as Stephen puts it, “A man of genius makes no mistakes. His errors 
are volitional and are the portals of discovery” (U 182). I explore this creative process 
of desire and loss in the case of Stephen and Bloom, whereby the traumatic emptiness 
or impasse in the self generates the negative capability by which these characters 
creatively push into the unknown.   
 Stephen and Bloom both avoid home, and they both voluntarily inflict suffering 
upon themselves. Through a parallax view, we can we can observe how the traumatic 
emptiness inherent in the self pushes one toward failure and loss: in this way, one 
pushes past the ‘inauthenticity’ of Imaginary and Symbolic supports, and confronts the 
abyss of the Real. This confrontation loops back in an ‘eternal return,’ an imperfect 
cycle whereby Joyce’s characters are renewed without recourse to redemption; where 
the ‘everlasting’ Christian model is undermined and replaced by the ‘incertitude’ of the 
void. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The premise of James Joyce’s 1922 novel Ulysses is fairly straightforward: on June 16, 
1904 in Dublin, Ireland, the characters Stephen Dedalus and Leopold Bloom avoid 
going home. There are of course countless ways to summarize the plot, but my work 
here approaches Ulysses from this general angle. Joyce structures the novel in relation 
to Homer’s Odyssey, but if not for the extratextual notes and schemas he leaked to 
editors and friends, this point may have gone altogether unnoticed for quite some time. 
From their respective beginnings in Ulysses, Stephen’s and Bloom’s thoughts are 
coupled with physical movement, a peripatesis both parallel to and juxtaposed against 
the inner world of thought. Joyce’s use of two central narrators (among multiple and 
sometimes indiscernible narrators) demands that we examine the same day in the same 
city through different eyes.  
 The theme of sustained movement and different perspectives is highlighted by 
Joyce’s deliberate reference to the phenomenon of parallax, which appears eight times 
in the novel. In one instance, Bloom walks through Dublin and looks at the clock tower, 
thinking of Molly’s impending adultery with Boylan: “Think no more about that. After 
one. Time ball on the ballast office is down. Dunsink time. Fascinating little book that is 
of Sir Robert Ball’s. Parallax. I never exactly understood. There’s a priest. Could ask 
him. Par it’s Greek: parallel, parallax. […] O rocks!” (U 147). Fitting its own seemingly 
stubborn assertion of self-contradictory positions, parallax has multiple nuances 
depending on the situation to which it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
parallax: “The effect whereby the position or direction of an object appears to differ 
when viewed from different positions, e.g. through the viewfinder and the lens of a 
camera.” Parallax is also useful in astronomy, as “the angular amount of parallax in a 
particular case, especially that of a star viewed from different points in the earth’s 
orbit.” Regarding the etymological origins of parallax, the OED states finally: “late 16th 
century: from French parallaxe, from Greek parallaxis 'a change', from parallassein 'to 
alternate', based on allassein 'to exchange' (from allos 'other').”  
 Thus, parallax tends to combines perception, alternation, and exchange between 
the self and others or the external world. Most importantly perhaps is that parallax 
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involves shifting, rather than fixed, positions whereby we (attempt to) exchange 
ourselves with the other in order to gain a parallax view. The Parallax View is the 
subject and title of Slavoj Zizek’s fairly recent (2006) work which examines 
transcendental materialist subjectivity via political and cultural situations and artefacts. 
While some critics have focused on Stephen and Bloom as dual perspectives of a 
composite whole, I want to look at the tension in each and between the two, this 
parallax gap whereby constant shifting is both cause and product of creative discovery.  
 As for anyone approaching Ulysses, some general understanding of Western 
philosophy and Christianity is useful, if not presumed. My analysis deals heavily in 
Kantian thought and German Idealism as interpreted and extended by Zizek. The formal 
requirements of this thesis disallow detailed explanation of these foundational 
philosophies or of Christian theology, but in cases where I refer to aspects of either I 
intend to clarify anything which might be opaque to the general reader. 
 The primary texts I use in exploring my hypothesis are Ulysses, by James 
Joyce, and The Parallax View, by Slavoj Zizek. I’ve limited the textual selections from 
Ulysses to episodes and images which lend to multiple readings from various angles. It 
is my intention to work and rework these selections within the analysis, rather than 
create an exhaustive overview of the entire novel. In the theory section that follows, I 
will thoroughly explain the psychoanalytical and philosophical aspect of parallax as it is 
understood by Zizek. In the analysis, I will apply Zizek’s ontology in order to uncover 
instances and implications of parallax in the case of Stephen and Bloom. Though it’s 
not possible to fully separate concepts such as ontology from temporality, I’ll try to 
draw transparent arguments regarding ontology and the individual in relation to 
spatial/material-, temporal- and social structures. In the conclusion, I will discuss 
connections and disparities between the two characters, and what parallax ultimately 
means for both.  
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2.  Thesis Statement  
 
I argue that Zizek’s ontological framework, culminating in the theory of the parallax 
gap, provides a useful structure for analyzing the ontological and social problems which 
Stephen and Bloom confront in Joyce’s Ulysses. By tracing the subjectivity of each 
character and their interactions via this theoretical framework, it becomes apparent that 
parallax is more than a combination of their two perspectives, it’s the impasse at the 
core of being, the very antagonism inside each character. This antagonistic rift extends 
from the microcosm to the macrocosm, from subjective concerns to temporal and spatial 
concerns. In this way, Joyce’s textual references to parallax are more than exposition of 
scientific theory: he incorporates parallax in the text through the very structure of these 
characters’ modes of experiencing, their ways of interacting with each other and the 
world. Stephen has not fully resolved the tension of his rejection of religion, thus this 
negation itself, a failed resolution, creates a constant parallax gap in his experiencing. In 
his constant contemplation of Christian thought, his reflexive activity of dis/belief 
provides the very tension by which he upholds his rejection of the faith. In a similar 
way, Bloom has difficulty resolving the tension between his complicity with and 
aversion to Molly’s rendezvous with Boylan; his day is spent using material detail and 
libidinal fantasy to vacillate between desire and disgust and thus confront the impasse at 
the core of his own being. Bloom and Stephen both meet while avoiding home. Rather 
than seeking a perfect unity or circularity, the traumatic impasse of the parallax gap 
creates a radical trajectory into the unknown, where the abyssal confrontation with the 
Real illustrates the creative potential in rejecting unattainable Symbolic and Imaginary 
ideals for the productive tension of the parallax gap.  
 
 
3.  Theory and Criticism 
 
3.1 Zizek and The Parallax View 
This method of examining the tension between incommensurable positions is what 
Zizek calls ‘the parallax view.’ In a work bearing the same title, he discusses various 
7 
 
cultural artefacts which create or embody the phenomenon of parallax. Zizek gives the 
parallax phenomenon a philosophical and psychoanalytical treatment, exploring cultural 
and political cases of parallax, and how psychological phenomena such as desire and 
identity interact within the self and the social context. Parallax spatially denotes a view 
of the same object from two different points in space, whereby multiple perspectives 
allow us to view the same object with different results. 
 Zizek explains parallax as “the confrontation of two closely linked perspectives 
between which no neutral common ground is possible” (PV 4). Though this lack of 
common ground is the very ‘thing’ that constitutes the parallax, the simultaneity of two 
(or more) perspectives, it’s ontologically negative in that, as a tension, it can’t be 
posited. That’s why it’s referred to as a gap, a lack: rather than being the one position or 
the other, it is the minimal difference between the two. The lack of a neutral common 
ground results in a “gap between two points of perspective, perceptible only in the shift 
from the one to the other” (PV 26). Thus the very movement, rather than the one 
position or the other, allows one to see or be aware of the parallax gap. This gap allows 
space for multiple considerations which would otherwise be limited by an assertion of 
one ‘true’ position or a relativist assertion of the ‘truth’ of both positions.  
 In this way, the parallax gap corresponds to the Lacanian Real, but differs in 
that it is a negativity, rather than a position: “The Real is thus the disavowed X on 
account of which our vision of reality is anamorphically distorted. […] This means that, 
ultimately, the status of the Real is purely parallactic,” and “thus opposed to the 
standard (Lacanian) notion of the Real” (PV 26).  For this reason, my analysis shouldn’t 
be considered fully Lacanian: though Zizek (and therefore, I) use the Lacanian term ‘the 
Real,’ it should be understood throughout this thesis in Zizek’s terms, as that which 
allows us to experience or encounter the parallax gap. Rather than enforcing ontological 
closure via a true/false dichotomy, this gap opens a space rife with creative possibility 
in the text and interpretive possibility for the reader.  
 Joyce’s earlier works foreground the techniques he further develops in Ulysses. 
Even prior to A Portrait, Joyce works with parallax shift in the short story ‘Araby’ in 
Dubliners: The boy’s relation to himself, his perception of his object of confused desire, 
and the carnival at Araby – these change in proportion to the boy’s internal movement 
from fantasy to the Real: as Zizek puts it, “the very thing which, viewed from a proper 
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distance, looks like the supreme Good changes into repulsive Evil the moment we come 
too near it” (PV 187). This is what makes the before-and-after difference – in the boy 
(and his perception of himself), of his object(s) of desire, and his social-spatial milieu 
(home, the train, the carnival at Araby) – indiscernible as it is striking: temporal and 
proximal shifts affect no substantial difference in the qualities of these things. There is 
no change without, only a change within. Each simply “appears in a different light only 
due to a parallax shift of our perspective” (PV 187). Fantasy thus requires a ‘proper 
distance,’ as the Real is too much to bear. Therefore the space between perceiver and 
perceived always contains gradations of fantasy and reality.   
 The ‘plague of fantasies’ begins within us, this quest for an identity, which 
must always end fruitless: one either accepts that the self is empty, and that identity is a 
failure; or one clings to material demarcations in an attempt to ‘hold’ or claim and 
identity, thereby enacting a self-delusional grasping after externalities which fail to 
function as ontological internalities or ‘self.’ This is the impasse of the self, which 
parallactically produces and limits knowledge, as will be shown in the analysis. Both 
Stephen and Bloom attempt to gain knowledge of the empty fantasy in order to move 
beyond it. In Zizekian terms, they use loss and failure to ‘traverse the fantasy.’ 
 It’s perhaps difficult to understand the text of The Parallax View without an 
understanding of what might be called Zizek’s ‘big three’: Kant’s epistemological-
ontological theory in A Critique of Pure Reason, the German Idealists (most notably 
Hegel) who thought/wrote in response to this work, and Lacan’s interpretation of this 
trajectory of thought. The whole of Zizek’s oeuvre hinges upon the assertion and 
explanation of the immanence of the ontological gap. This requires a bit of background.  
 Kant posited an ontological divide between the noumenal and the phenomenal. 
The noumenal is the form or concept of a thing, whereas the phenomenal is the 
epistemological entity or object, the thing as it presents itself to a cognitively perceiving 
being. In terms of cognizance and subjectivity, this deceptively simple split irrevocably 
ruptures our understanding: to think of oneself as a noumenal idea (and thus 
immanently separate from and potentially inaccessible to us) simultaneously with 
oneself as a phenomenal being (perhaps yet further separated from our ‘self’ in that we 
fail to locate these or any thoughts within this substantial entity) creates a rift in our 
sense of self. According to Zizek, Kant ultimately “reduced the transcendental horizon 
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to a way in which reality appears to a finite being (man), with all of it located in a wider 
encompassing realm of noumenal reality” (PV 25). This other space beyond 
phenomenal reality is generally regarded as Kant’s fundamental limitation. Zizek argues 
rather that the gap of incommensurability is built into reality: “the place of freedom is in 
fact not noumenal, but the gap between phenomenal and noumenal” (PV 25). There are 
no ‘two worlds apart’, but rather, immanence and its inherent gap. 
 Though any pure philosophy disallows conflation of Kant’s noumenal and 
Aristotle’s formal or Plato’s ideal (Ulysses’ characters also disapprove: “John 
Eglington, frowning, said, with waxing wroth: Upon my word it makes my blood boil to 
hear anyone compare Aristotle with Plato.” U 178) it’s easy to see basic similarities. 
Both suppose a transcendental concept to or from which a thing refers, thus an 
ontological position (a noumenal/formal world) that would otherwise nullify or fill the 
negativity of a parallax gap. Zizek allows for no such position. A position affirms 
positive being, while the negativity of the gap accedes only to negation, the lack in 
being. In Ulysses, Stephen refers to Aristotle a number of times. This thesis regards 
philosophy from a Zizekian standpoint, so Stephen’s musings on form, for example, 
will be filtered through Zizek rather than Aristotle.  
 Zizek’s transcendental materialist subjectivity is the foundation of The Parallax 
View and Zizek’s philosophy as a whole. Simply put, our subjectivity transcends our 
material being. As mentioned, we fail to locate our thoughts about our self within the 
physical matter of our self, and we fail to separate—or integrate—the cognizing ‘I’ from 
the ‘thing that is me.’ Thought seems to be something that stems from, yet is not 
bounded by, our corporeal matter. What separates this line of thinking from the 
Cartesian ergo sum is in its most basic ontological proposition: Descartes claims “I 
think, therefore I am,” where Zizek finds no causal link between thinking and being, 
only an inseparable negativity. Further, one’s self-concept is built around the trauma of 
being, which entails non-being at its core. This is the primordial trauma, where one is 
‘thrown’ (to borrow from Heidegger) into the world from nothing or nowhere.  
 
Lacan’s Imaginary, Symbolic, Real 
Part of this trauma is the material alienation that occurs with language acquisition. 
Language fails to fully re-connect us to the lost experience of primordial non-being and 
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the neonatal connection previous to developing subjective understanding. This 
impossible lack repeats its unattainability through our desires and drives, which lean 
upon the supports of the Imaginary and Symbolic to build in response to this and other 
traumas we encounter by living. Our jouissance, the inextricable pleasure and pain that 
drives us irrespective of such Imaginary/Symbolic supports, is what brings us closest to 
the Real. The Real is thus threatening: by giving us what we desire, it effectively 
destroys our desire. This is why Zizek claims that “jouissance is that which we can 
never reach, attain, and that which we can never get rid of” (PV 115, Zizek’s emphasis). 
To avoid the threat of the Real, we tend to remain in the comfort of our imaginary 
projections and fantasies, the comfort of symbolic structures.   
 People tend to orient themselves by seeking identities defined by social 
symbolic structures, within the guise of historical social reality. In A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man, Stephen Dedalus famously renounces allegiance to the ‘holy 
trinity’ of God, Nation, and Family. All three patriarchal symbolic structures are tied to 
Stephen’s native land of Ireland. The ‘nationless’ Stephen Dedalus as an artist can be 
likened to the ‘free’ Zizek as a philosopher:  
For a philosopher, ethnic roots, national identity, and so on, are simply not a 
category of truth—or, to put it in precise Kantian terms, when we reflect 
upon our ethnic roots, we engage in a private use of reason, constrained by 
contingent dogmatic presuppositions; that is to say, we act as “immature” 
individuals, not as free human beings who dwell in the dimension of the 
universality of reason. (PV 9) 
These symbolic structures are embedded in and constitutive of historical social reality. 
What, then, is the difference between reality and the Real? Stephen’s attempts at 
understanding objective ‘reality’ lead us to its inseparability from his subjectivity. 
Heusel delineates Stephen’s experience in terms of perception and reality: 
We are reminded of Stephen’s experiments with perception in ‘Proteus.’ 
There Stephen’s mind wrestles with the changing face of the world, best 
depicted by the waves on the ocean. He begins with the ‘signatures of 
things,’ rather than their reality, which the mind receives through eyesight. 
(Heusel 136, Heusel’s emphasis) 
Heusel sets up a dichotomy between signifier (“signatures”) and signified (“reality”) 
here, but doesn’t get down to the problems with or between the two. The term ‘reality’ 
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usually implies a social consensus in regard to the perceivable world and various semi-
perceptible phenomena (electricity for example). Its preliminary entry in the OED calls 
reality “the quality or state of being real,” which is a tautology. Reality is then further 
defined as: “real existence; what is real rather than imagined or desired; the aggregate of 
real things or existences; that which underlies and is the truth of appearances or 
phenomena.” Real is defined in opposition to imagination and desire, and is supposed to 
‘underlie’ as the truth of appearances, like Kant’s noumenal (or Aristotle’s formal) 
realm. When Heusel states that Stephen is “here to read the signatures of things, rather 
than their reality,” she similarly disregards the way imagination, desire, and belief 
influence one’s perception of reality, as well as ontological dilemmas such as truth and 
appearance. This common, cursory elision fails to account for the inseparability of 
subjectivity and ontology. This approach  
accepts so-called ‘external reality’ as such, as something given in advance, 
and reduces the problem of the ‘psychical apparatus’ to the question of how 
(if at all) this apparatus succeeds in accommodating itself to reality, in 
connecting, ‘coupling’ with it. In this perspective, the definition of 
‘normalcy’ is a psychical apparatus open to reality, whereas the psyche is 
‘pathogenic’ if, instead of establishing proper contact with reality, it builds 
its own ‘disjointed’ universe. (EYS 47, Zizek’s emphasis) 
Heusel fails to recognize the non-neutrality of reality and rather seems to posit reality as 
the generalized “historically specified form of social reality” (EYS 47, Zizek’s 
emphasis). Historical social reality thus limits the individual psyche to a conformist 
position (normalcy, sanity) or a critical position (pathological). Zizek claims that our 
psyche operates on the pleasure principle, which only adjusts itself to the reality 
principle as a means of self-preservation in the face of traumatic cuts or losses. Even 
from this critical standpoint, it may seem difficult to establish reality as something other 
than a priori. Zizek’s point is that external reality does not cause the trauma which 
derails the pleasure principle, but rather our own inherent lack does.  
There is something in the very immanent functioning of the psyche, 
notwithstanding the pressure of ‘external reality,’ which resists full 
satisfaction. In other words, even if the psychic apparatus is entirely left to 
itself, it will not attain the balance for which the ‘pleasure principle’ strives, 
but will continue to circulate around a traumatic intruder to its interior—the 
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limit upon which the ‘pleasure principle’ stumbles is internal to it. The 
Lacanian mathem for this foreign body, for this ‘internal limit,’ is of course 
objet petit a: […] objet a prevents the circle from closing, it introduces an 
irreducible displeasure, but the psychic apparatus finds a sort of perverse 
pleasure in this displeasure itself, in the never-ending, repeated circulation 
around the unattainable, always missed object. The Lacanian name for this 
‘pleasure in pain’ is of course enjoyment (jouissance), and the circular 
movement which finds satisfaction in failing again and again to attain the 
object, the movement whose true aim coincides therefore with its very path 
toward the goal, is the Freudian drive. The space of the drive is such a 
paradoxical, curved space: the objet a is not a positive entity existing in 
space, it is ultimately nothing but a certain curvature of the space itself 
which causes us to make a bend precisely when we want to get directly at the 
object. (EYS 48-49, Zizek’s emphases).  
This curvature of space appropriately mirrors the effect of stellar parallax which both 
main characters in Ulysses observe and consider. In this way, the seemingly maligned 
external world reads like a reflection of the disjointed internal psyche. 
 I will demonstrate the ways in which both Stephen and Bloom approach 
‘reality’ with a critical, disjointed view. Parallax illustrates this very gap, this 
inconsistency that inheres in the subject and the extended world and drives one to seek 
loss or failure. Zizek’s ontological exercises and previous work culminate in this 
phenomenon, ergo an application of these underlying processes leads to a clearer 
understanding of parallax and how it helps explain why these characters are bent on 
enacting loss. For this reason, I’ve chosen to read Ulysses through The Parallax View.  
 
3.2 Brivic on Joyce 
As Zizek’s thought is heavily influenced by Lacan, it’s no surprise that the two are often 
paired in academic discourse, as in Brivic’s work on Joyce. Brivic claims that Zizek’s 
parallax “corresponds to [Lacan’s] sinthome, which is always divided between two 
levels, and like the sinthome, the parallax requires movement (two points of view)” 
(Brivic 22). Lacan’s sinthome proposes that knowledge can only be created via 
discovery, since meaning can only be applied after the fact. As Zizek puts it, “symptoms 
are meaningless traces, their meaning is not discovered, excavated from the hidden 
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depth of the past, but constructed retroactively - the analysis produces the truth” 
(Sublime Object 58). Thus truth is not something innate or preexisting, but the very 
process of discovery and interpretation. This is a simplified version of Kierkegaard’s 
famous assertion that “life must be lived forwards, but can only be understood 
backwards.” Though Zizek hasn’t done specific readings on Joyce as an object of 
inquiry, Lacan claims Joyce as inspiration for a number of his seminars. Lacan’s 
sinthome inspired Zizek’s Enjoy Your Symptom!, and my work here will also touch 
upon the symptoms/sinthomes in Ulysses both as they are part of a creative process 
(thus, to be enjoyed) and as they relate to the parallax gap.  
 Brivic says that Homer’s Odyssey “embodies a journey because the subject 
must become an object that is a process in order to realize itself” (Brivic 115). The 
subject must self-objectify in order to gain critical self-awareness. The spatial irony 
between thinker and thing-observed is the negative space which allows for this process. 
Thus, the ironic distance here allows for a sort of internal ‘journey’ whereby the subject 
makes itself real. With this Homeric narrative as its model, Ulysses forces us into 
foreign territory without and within. A common supposition of travel is that the barrage 
of the unfamiliar heightens our senses: awareness becomes keen, and memories are 
made sharp and lasting. Awareness amplifies in relation to difference as perceptual and 
interpretive patterns suffer a shocking break from habitual or normal situations and 
responses. Outside of our comfort zone, we cast a questioning gaze back at ourselves: 
amongst strangers, we are effectively strange, even to ourselves.  
 This is a simplified and preliminary explanation for why loss of self is key to 
creating oneself: the moment one is estranged from oneself, one is impelled to 
acknowledge this lack (of self-understanding) and to do something with this emptiness. 
The recognition of this lack doesn’t require extensive travel (the characters here only 
traverse their own city of Dublin), though it helps to illuminate it: for inasmuch as we 
‘posit’ a firm identity, we miss its inherent kernel of negativity, and cling to external or 
symbolic demarcations which further alienate. To self-realize is arguably (and 
paradoxically) to resist such a position. Stephen and Bloom are constantly on the move 
– with and without purpose, mentally and physically – not only to find meaning, but as 
a means of creating meaning for themselves. This is what Brivic calls the ‘dynamic 
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imperative’: subjectivity constantly changes truth, because truth is an act of circulation, 
rather than a fixed point.  
 In Joyce through Lacan and Zizek, Brivic uses Lacanian theory and Zizek’s 
interpretations of it to examine three of Joyce’s works: A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man, Ulysses, and Finnegan’s Wake. The section on A Portrait explores young 
Stephen as a hysteric subject who uses the feminine power of creating knowledge as a 
response to the masculine oppressor who claims knowledge. Much of what Brivic 
discusses here is applicable to both Stephen and Bloom in Ulysses.  
 The middle section of JTLZ examines Ulysses in three chapters, with emphasis 
on Lacan’s theory of the sinthome. In the first of these chapters, Brivic links Ulysses 
with its Homeric counterpart, claiming that the Odyssey works so well as a model for 
Ulysses because “Odysseus’ major objective – from a modern point of view – is to get 
lost” (Brivic 10). The following chapter explores the creative act of discovery within 
Ulysses as it corresponds to Lacan’s definition of the sinthome: “a temporary splicing of 
the functions of ordinary consciousness onto further levels that allow[s] them to 
reconstitute themselves” (Brivic 10).  
 Brivic’s third chapter on Ulysses explores the chapter ‘Circe,’ which reads 
Bloom’s social dealings through an economy of shame, where “shame is the real object 
of social exchange” (Brivic 10). These three suppositions – loss as impetus, sinthome as 
creative discovery, and shame as the object of exchange – are thus fairly well-trodden 
ground. Nonetheless, I’ve chosen different approaches and different textual matter, so 
though my work here is in close conversation with Brivic, my focus on other aspects of 
Ulysses intends to cover new ground.   
 
3.3 Society and the Subject: Althusser and Zizek 
According to Louis Althusser, the social situation always precedes the individual 
subject. Society ‘reads’ or ‘addresses’ the subject and thus integrates itself into one’s 
subjectivity. The self, therefore, is predetermined to an extent: we never begin as a 
blank slate, but are born into a world which foists symbolic identity demarcations (i.e., 
gender, nationality, religion) upon us. Stephen and Bloom are not subjects in a vacuum: 
we must consider them within a preexisting social historical order. 
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 While the focus and spatial requirements of this thesis disallow an in-depth 
survey of the novel’s sociopolitical climate, I will consider the oppressive functions of 
gender and colonialism in relation to my arguments. Joyce was critical of normative 
gender roles and colonial rule. The implicit ‘claim to truth’ and power to enunciate is 
precisely the function of such hegemonic structures, to render themselves seemingly a 
priori in the ontology of historical social reality. This invisibility mirrors the ontological 
function of history itself: history is that which, “precisely by staying invisible, by 
eluding the subject’s grasp, in advance determines its field of vision: what we can see, 
as well as what we cannot see, is always given to us through a historically mediated 
frame of preconceits” (EYS 15). This frame entices the subject to act in relation to being 
as if on a timeline, rather than recognizing the openness of time as something in the 
process of unfolding. This ‘false historicity’ will be explored further in the analysis.  
 The frame of history is arguably determined by the hegemonic utterance of 
Truth. This ‘claim to truth’ of the oppressor is what interpellates subjects. In his own 
words, Althusser’s duplicate mirror-structure of ideology ensures simultaneously: 
1. the interpellation of ‘individuals’ as subjects; 
2. their subjection to the Subject; 
3. the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects’ 
recognition of each other, and finally the subject’s recognition of himself; 
4. the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on 
condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave 
accordingly, everything will be alright: Amen – ‘So be it’. (Althusser 55) 
Althusser’s mirror-structure of ideology is influenced by Lacan’s psychoanalytical 
theory of the mirror stage. Lacan claims that subjectivity is formed by the subject’s 
misrecognition of him/herself. Althusser ties this misrecognition to ideological 
structures which interpellate the individual. Lacan and Zizek both explain how the free 
will inherent to being forces us to make choices, and thus limits our freedom. The angst 
of being relates to the impossibility inscribed in the burden of freedom. In Althusser’s 
terms, this impossibility is the paradox itself:   
In the ordinary use of the term, subject in fact means: (1) a free 
subjectivity, a centre of initiatives, author of and responsible for its 
actions; (2) a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is 
16 
 
therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his 
submission. This last note gives us the meaning of this ambiguity, which 
is merely a reflection of the effect which produces it: the individual is 
interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the 
commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept 
his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of 
his subjection ‘all by himself’. (56, Althusser’s emphasis)  
In this way, being a subject and being free is a paradox foisted upon the subject through 
the subject’s inextricable being in historical social reality and its authoritative 
structures. 
 In relation to the repressive structures of imperialist power, Zizek’s ‘symptomal 
reading’ seeks to locate the symptoms which undermine the totality of the structure. 
Zizek claims that  
modernism endeavors to subvert [this totality] by detecting the traces of its 
hidden truth in the details which ‘stick out’ and belie its ‘official’ truth, in 
the margins which point toward what has to be ‘repressed’ so that the 
‘official’ totality could establish itself—modernism’s elementary axiom is 
that details always contain some surplus which undermines the universal 
frame of the ‘official’ Truth. (EYS 120)  
As a modernist text, Ulysses gives insight into how the colonial force builds its power 
upon the hegemonic utterance of “official Truth,” and how this power can be subverted 
in drawing attention to the repression which founds it.  
 As I’ll show in the analysis, Stephen and Bloom are quite Lacanian in their 
subversion of such ideological structures. “‘The big Other doesn’t exist,’ as Lacan puts 
it: it is just a subject’s presupposition—the presupposition of an immaterial, ideal order 
[…] that guarantees the ultimate meaning and consistency of the subject’s experience” 
(EYS 58). Althusser’s theory of interpellation is a useful method for speaking of the way 
in which ideology addresses its would-be subject, but we have to also consider the 
subject’s actions and response. As Zizek puts it, “Althusser misrecognizes the specific 
agency of the ‘ideal,’ ‘immaterial’ big Other […] This ‘big Other’ is retroactively 
posited […] by the subject in the very act by means of which he is caught in the cobweb 
of ideology” (EYS 59). In simpler terms, we deny our own agency by giving power to 
ideological symbols. This tautology reveals the ontological impasse of ideologies and 
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symbolic structures which try to impose themselves as a priori. They are instead 
historical contingencies, built upon the work of the “subject [who] poses the big Other 
in the guise of Historical Reason or divine Providence in the very moment and gesture 
of conceiving himself as its executor, its unconscious tool” (EYS 59). In this way, the 
subject effectively speaks the ‘big Other’ into being. 
 
The Structure of the Analysis 
 
I’ve read Ulysses through this theoretical material in order to understand the actions and 
motives of Stephen and Bloom, and the implications for textual body of the novel. The 
analysis is composed of two primary parts. The first part focuses on Stephen, the second 
part on Bloom, with occasional overlap. These two primary parts contain subsections 
which build a successive argument that traces the intersections of subjectivity and 
historical social reality and the means by which the subject confronts ontological states 
at the level of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. The parallax gap is thus part and 
productive of a fundamental lack at the minimal level of being, a rift which spreads 
outward into larger structures and creates an empty space for these two characters to 
explore unanticipated modes of being.  
 The first section on Stephen discusses the internal limit in the Self, the void at 
the core of being. This impasse in ontology is inscribed in subjectivity and historical 
social reality, which mirror one another in a sense. The second section discusses the 
trauma created by this lack of closure in the Self, and how this relates to the primordial 
trauma. The primordial trauma, as mentioned, deals with our anxiety in regard to the 
unknown which bookends our existence, before birth (or conscious awareness) and after 
death. Stephen attempts to understand the roles that his mother, his father, and God 
might have played in his creation, even as he ultimately rejects all three as authority 
figures. Stephen’s sense-experiments reveal how this trauma is bound up with broader 
considerations of temporality, where the enclosure of finitude paradoxically disallows 
(an experience of) infinity yet disallows (us to experience) time to stop. The bearing of 
the symbolic upon one’s relation to self and society is the focus of the third section. 
Stephen’s mother’s unconditional demand (and his ‘repetition’ via unconditional 
refusal) of the rites of final prayer is arguably the objet petit a, the core trauma around 
18 
 
which Stephen’s subjectivity circulates.  Here, God and the mother are extended 
symbolically in society as Church and the family. These are the primary structural 
forces which Stephen must contend with. His weapon is, paradoxically, the colonially 
imposed English language: the fourth section demonstrates how the colonizer’s tools, in 
the hands of the subject, can be subversively appropriated for the purposes of 
undermining the oppressive symbolic order in which they are embedded.  
 In the first section of analysis on Bloom, I’ll examine how Molly’s adultery is 
effectively Bloom’s own missive of extramarital desire sent back to him. The second 
section examines his subjective ontology as he is interpellated by societal symbolic 
structures, and the ways in which his productive deflection subverts the hegemonic 
order. I combine the focal points of desire and ontology to explore the production of 
disgust and waste within a colonial framework. The nationalist narrative constitutes 
Bloom as its ‘foreign body’ or waste product, which allows him a critical viewpoint 
toward these symbolic structures. In the fourth section, temporality is the focus of a 
discussion on transcendental materialism. The material and immaterial are caught and 
inverted in a false historicity, a ruse by which Bloom attempts to deny his own 
masochistic desire. Here, I’ll look at how Bloom traverses the Imaginary and Symbolic 
to arrive at the Real. The final section will reveal the ‘successful failure’ of Bloom’s 
quest, where I demonstrate how his imperfect repetition of the known affects a push into 
the unknown, thus allowing him to confront the Real of his gaping trauma, a void left in 
the absence of imaginary and symbolic structures.   
 
 
4.0 Analysis Pt. I 
Stephen Dedalus 
 
4.1   The Mirror and the Cut: Subjectivity as failure of self-recognition  
In order to understand why Stephen is on an intentional mission for failure, we must 
first understand the ontological tensions at the root of his being. Joyce sets up the 
problem of external reality and subjectivity in the very first line of Ulysses with the 
image “a mirror and a razor lay crossed” (U 3). That Joyce has placed a razor upon this 
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mirror, both as an object and a reflected image, evokes the cut between the noumenal 
and the phenomenal, and the inherent problem: How can we understand this suture 
between reality and its representation? This subtle image connotes a subjective 
perception at cross-purposes with reality, as well as its obverse, whereby immanent 
phenomenal reality cuts with its substance through the symbolic noumenal world of 
idea or form. The mirror also implies the question of self, for ourselves and others: For 
what is a mirror, if not primarily an object by which to see oneself, and to prepare a face 
for others?  
 A mirror has a doubled existence as a substantial thing and yet a thing which 
also sees and interprets the world. The mirror contains itself: the substance which makes 
it reflect, and the mirror contains the reflection: an intangible image, a symbol. As Zizek 
might say, something is ‘in the mirror more than the mirror itself.’ Stephen asks this 
question of himself, considering his own image in the glass: “Stephen bent forward and 
peered at the mirror held out to him, cleft by a crooked crack, hair on end. As he and 
others see me. Who chose this face for me? This dogsbody to rid of vermin. It asks me 
too” (U 8).  
 Stephen feels the split in himself and the suture between the phenomenal and 
the noumenal. He is estranged, not only as an object for these others, but as an object 
for and from himself: “it asks me too.” This ‘it’ and ‘me’ illustrate Kant’s notion of the 
subject as divided against itself. To move from Kant to Zizek, the incompleteness or un-
wholeness of the subject is immanent. Appropriately, the mirror is ‘cleft by a crooked 
crack.’  The Kantian distinction between noumenal (the transcendental ‘form’ of a 
thing) and phenomenal (the perceivable epistemological thing itself) in relation to 
Stephen is represented here by his noumenal ‘it’ and phenomenal ‘me’. The noumenal 
‘it’ is the objectified body/Self at a remove from Stephen’s self-understanding, and the 
phenomenal ‘me’ is the Self doing the thinking, myself yet semantically removed from 
the Self doing the thinking. Thus the self-alienation, the split. 
 In Lacanian thought, ‘me’ (moi) is tantamount to the Freudian ‘ego’, a 
psychoanalytic stage of development in which one recognizes oneself in a mirror, and 
thereby attains self-reflexivity. Lacan’s crucial insight here though is not the occurrence 
of self-apprehension, but that “this ‘recognition’ is inherently a ‘misrecognition’ 
[méconnaissance]” (Johnston 7). In a double movement, Stephen fails to recognize 
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himself: first, he can’t see himself as others see him (one cannot physically observe 
one’s own face without the help of a mirror, nor can one access the sense-impressions 
received/formed by those who see him); second, he fails to overcome the gap between 
the I of subjective cognizance and the me of objectified self-reflection.  
 The problem remains as to Stephen’s inability to see himself as others see him, 
and his cursory claim that the mirror might allow for it: “myself as others see me.” Of 
course Stephen fails to recognize himself, to self-associate, because, as Zizek puts it, 
“the ‘subject’ itself is nothing but the failure of symbolization, of its own symbolic 
representation” (Zizek quoted in Johnson, 10. Zizek’s emphasis). The mirror image is a 
symbolic representation, and the cognizance which apprehends this representation can 
never achieve a seamless connection to something which is thus an extension of its own 
cognizance, outside of itself so to speak, and thus alienated from its being and 
understanding. Stephen feels the emptiness of his ego, the empty place of the ‘me’: 
Given a Lacanian conception of subjectivity, any form of self-
acquaintance alienates the subject from itself, derailing this emptiness 
into the fleshed-out fullness of the ego and its embodied avatars. Since 
both Lacan and Zizek associate the philosophically loaded term self with 
what psychoanalysis calls the ego, self and subject are construed as two 
opposed poles. Zizek proclaims that the Lacanian matheme $ (for the 
“barred” or split subject) signifies this primordial failure, this “lost 
cause” of the search for selfhood. Subjectivity itself is, ultimately, the 
permanent tension between the phenomenal, experientially constituted 
ego and the quasi-noumenal, unrepresentable manque-à-être (lack of 
being) in relation to which every determinate identity-construct is a 
defensive, fantasmatic response. (Johnston 9) 
This permanent tension marks the inherent lack inscribed in immanence, which resists 
reduction into the phenomenal and noumenal ‘two worlds apart’. This lack is the 
traumatic failure of recognition that constitutes subjectivity. The experience of reality 
can’t be separated as such, thus Stephen’s dilemma reveals Joyce’s stance in regard to 
these problems of being, where Stephen’s complication forces us to see the “intersection 
between the epistemological and ontological aspects, the way ‘reality’ itself is caught in 
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the movement of our knowing it […] or, vice-versa, how our knowing of reality is 
embedded in reality itself” (PV 28).   
 Stephen’s pained misrecognition is compounded by nausea at the recognition of 
the genetic inheritance of his parents—he disassociates from the repulsive image that is 
himself, combined as it is with elements of his mother and father, and not of his own 
choosing. He can neither understand the ‘split’ in reality nor in himself. The mirror 
forces him to associate with this body he beholds in the mirror, yet he can’t recognize it 
as his Self: part of this anxiety is due to the subject’s inability to access, much less 
fathom, its preconditions for existence. In this way, the ‘lost cause of the search for 
selfhood’ is signified by the primordial failure.   
 
4.2  Primordial Anxiety and Temporo-Spatial Irony 
In the Proteus chapter, Stephen’s sense experiments, his shadow-play and consideration 
of nacheinander/nebeneinander illustrate how concepts such as matter and form are 
inseparable from concepts such as time and extension. Stephen’s process of doubt 
creates a temporo-spatial irony by which he further self-objectifies and thus explores 
himself and the world. We deal with a “primordially chaotic and discordant Real that 
produces its own negation immanently out of itself” (Johnston 22). Proteus, the 
representative of such substance, is a shape-shifter which Stephen relates to the primal 
Father and the fertile ocean Mother. Here, Stephen grapples with this chaotic Real and 
its immanent negation, and the connection between primordial material and temporality. 
 In the psychoanalytical mirror stage during infancy, the subject is initially 
formed via a violent reaction to witnessing his or her own reflection. For Lacan, the 
mirror stage goes beyond infant development and represents a permanent structure in 
subjective development, where one’s symbolic image in the mirror is a problematic 
illusion. Appropriately, Stephen both does and does not associate with his reflection. 
Repulsed at the sight of his genetic inheritance, Stephen willingly accepts his 
debasement. He is the very ‘vermin’ that he seeks to rid himself of. He cannot separate 
or reduce his ‘father’s face’ (his materiality) and his semi-transcendental cognizing I 
into discrete entities, much less extract either from his being.  
22 
 
 People generally attempt to understand life as if on a timeline, to rationalize 
isolated events by arranging history into a meaningful totality. The Lacanian ‘logic of 
the signifier’ reveals how such a totality is paradoxical:  
The ‘horizon of meaning’ is always linked, as if by a kind of umbilical cord, 
to a point within the field disclosed by it; the frame of our view is always 
already framed (re-marked) by a part of its content. We can easily recognize 
here the topology of the Moebius band where, as in a kind of abyssal 
inversion, the envelope itself is encased by its interior. (EYS 15)   
In a similar inversion, Stephen claims that he was ‘made but not begotten’ (U 38). He 
theoretically invokes divine infinitude to transcend his finite material condition of being 
born of two parents, and appropriates for himself a position of having been divinely 
willed, a child of God, so to speak. He inscribes their sexual act within a religious 
framework: “the coupler’s will” (U 38) makes the act a transcendental thought of God, 
rather than a material act based in sexual drives. 
 Regarding Kant’s influence on Zizek’s Lacanian framework, Johnston claims 
that the “feelings of revulsion toward the corporeal substratum of the mortal body 
essentially are indicative of the presence of a form of subjectivity resistant to being 
collapsed back into its material foundation” (Johnston 25). Here (in Ulysses, at least) are 
the first intimations of Stephen grappling with the transcendental-material subjectivity: 
as a semi-transcendental subjectivity proceeding from, attempting to understand, and 
railing against, a material foundation in this primordial substance. “The essential idea 
here is that subjectivity, in its effective existence, is the most profound symptom of the 
human condition (the sinthome par excellence), a violent reaction-formation precipitated 
by and setting itself up against the corporeal condition” (Johnston 43). Being composed 
of matter and yet able to ‘transcend’ this matter with intangible thoughts and emotions 
causes a sort of internal rebellion in the form of the sinthome.  
 Stephen attempts to both situate himself within the human historicity, this 
“strandentwining cable of all flesh” (U 38), and then invokes the indestructibility of the 
divine Word to explain away his mortal finitude. Through Stephen, we see how this 
‘primordial anxiety’ deals with the existence of matter on a plane of both extension and 
time. Christianity is paradoxically embedded in nearly all his thoughts and 
considerations, part of his underlying sinthome, the trauma which returns. Philosophy 
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becomes mixed with litany: “See now. There all the time without you: and ever shall be, 
world without end” (U 38). The first phrase is arguably imperative: See now, where 
now is the object that one is impelled to see. This assumes the present as separate from 
past and future. The second phrase plays on the dual meaning of the word ‘without’ (i.e. 
Danish uden and udenfor,) where time is both there without (need) of you (whether you 
exist or not, i.e. independent of subjective cognition), and/or without (external to) you (a 
substance which surrounds you yet is not part of you). The end of the phrase, ‘and ever 
shall be, world without end,’ refers to the Gloria Patri, Catholic prayer to the Father, 
and proclaims God’s eternal will. To consider time as something separable or 
inseparable from oneself, its substance and one’s cognition in relation, is already a 
difficult matter; for Stephen this difficulty is compounded by the antagonistic Christian 
theological knowledge he possesses, which seems embedded in his very being.  
 Despite his professed nonbelief, he continues: “From before the ages He willed 
me and may not will me away or ever. A lex eterna stays about him” (U 38). If God’s 
will is embodied in the eternal Word, commanded with infinite wisdom, Stephen 
concludes that God’s acts are infinite and as such, irrevocable. Stephen thus inserts 
himself in an infinite temporal framework semantically bookended by ‘in the beginning 
was the Word’ and ‘world without end’ of the Gloria Patri. If the act of willing Stephen 
into being is eternally irrevocable, it follows that Stephen’s soul will persist forever. 
Why, then, can’t he experience infinity? The self, like infinity, or reality, lacks 
ontological closure. This is arguably why Stephen wonders if he is walking into infinity, 
rather than within its confines. As Zizek puts it, “what looks like an epistemological 
limitation of our capacity to grasp reality (the fact that we are forever perceiving reality 
from our temporal standpoint) is the positive ontological condition of reality itself,” (TS 
158).  
 Stephen shortly thereafter thinks: “Hold fast to the here, the now, by which all 
future plunges into the past” (U 178). We cannot ‘be’ in the future or the past, thus the 
only option for ‘being’ is now. This ‘now’ is unlocatable yet continuous, and as such, is 
arguably Stephen’s proposition for conceiving of eternity: “in philosophy, the point is 
not to conceive of eternity as opposed to temporality, but eternity as it emerges from 
within our temporal experience—or, in an even more radical way, as Schelling did it, to 
conceive time itself as a subspecies of eternity, as the resolution of a deadlock of 
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eternity” (PV 31). If the ‘here, the now’ were a positive position, it wouldn’t require 
such tenacity in order to hold fast to it, to ‘be’ in it. The ‘now’ itself seems to be a 
temporal negativity between future and past, a creative space for pushing into the 
unknown.  
 This ‘deadlock of eternity’ is our simultaneous inability to conceive of infinite 
or finite time, endlessness or an end to either the external (the world/universe) or the 
internal (the cognizing Self). Our rational comprehension of mortality supposes an 
external limit, while feeling no such internal limit. This very lack of internal limit is the 
excess of Lacan’s objet petit a, the object driving our desire, which disallows an internal 
grasp of either the end or infinite continuation of time.   
In general, the continuousness of the present is an enclosure that 
theoretically ensures against irony. Nobody understands cosmic irony better 
than Orpheus or Lot’s wife. Without distance, temporal and/or spatial from 
its object, irony obviously cannot manifest itself. This idea is integrated into 
the German term for ‘the present,’ Gegenwarte, compounded as it is by 
gegen - against, or contrary to - and Warte, a clear or lofty point of view. 
(Conley 82) 
Thus when we switch from considerations of cosmic time to Stephen’s near-sighted 
navel-gazing focused on the present moment, our view of his surroundings becomes 
blurry. The continuous ‘now’ of the lived-in present is contrary to a clear or omniscient 
perspective. Stephen applies this temporo-spatial irony to himself and his surroundings, 
attempting to understand the beginnings of time and the end of time, and infinity as it 
emerges from experience; he thus gains a parallactic non-position of omniscience 
juxtaposed with the moment: “Will you be as gods? Gaze in your omphalos. Hello. 
Kinch here. Put me on to Edenville” (U 38). Stephen’s ‘walking into infinity’ and non-
position of in/finitude mirrors the Post-Kantian solution read through Zizek: 
Through a purely formal, parallactic shift, Post-Kantian Idealism gains the 
insight that the reflective positing of the distinction constitutive of finitude 
already is the reconciliation. […] Kant is not unable to reach the infinite, 
because there is no such ‘thing’ as the infinite waiting to be discovered. This 
is why Kantian reflection always already inhabits the transcendent realm of 
freedom. Our freedom consists in the ability to draw the distinction 
constitutive of finitude. (Gabriel & Zizek 6) 
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Despite the freedom offered through this parallax, the ‘horizon of meaning’ enforced by 
historical social reality still leaves Stephen in a position between this very freedom and 
the false historicity of reality. Thus the antagonism inherent in the ontological structure 
in time is the very ‘disjointed reality’ that he builds through his critical view to 
historical social reality. If time seems to fail as a historico-social narrative chain and a 
spatio-temporal ontology, then it’s no surprise that for Stephen, like his doppelganger 
Hamlet, the ‘time is out of joint’: 
The irreducible temporality of act presupposes the paradoxical ontology of a 
space where there is always, constitutively, something ‘amiss,’ ‘out of joint,’ 
‘not at its own place.’ The famous line from Hamlet that the time is ‘out of 
joint’ should be ‘reflected into itself,’ as Hegel would say: from the 
experience of a certain period of time as ‘out of joint,’ corrupted, abnormal, 
pathological, we should pass to a ‘derailment,’ imbalance, that pertains to 
the very form of time: time as such implies spatial imbalance, a universe 
where the thing is always ‘wanting (at) its own place.’ It is against this 
background that we should conceive ‘being thrown into the world’ 
(Geworfenheit) as the fundamental determination of ‘being there’ (Dasein) 
with Heidegger: time is the irreducible horizon of our understanding of being 
precisely because ‘being there’ (‘man’) is in an ontologically constitutive 
way ‘out of its place,’ i.e., finds itself thrown into a place which is not ‘its 
own.’ (EYS 64, note 24, Zizek’s emphases) 
Stephen is, of course, associated with the tragic figure Hamlet throughout, whose echo 
rings here. We’ve seen how Stephen’s ‘disjointed’ reality created by his disbelief in a 
priori ‘reality’ is the very failure that constitutes his being. Now it’s apparent that the 
failure of temporality is inherent to the primordial failure: time existed before us, it will 
exist after us, and it’s impossible to perceive its existence at all, as anything other than a 
negativity, cast behind or before us, the nacheinander (one thing after another) of the 
count and the nebeneindander (one thing next to another) of space and substance. This 
space and substance is something we are thrown into, thus it to an extent first excludes 
‘what we are.’ In regard to temporality, the Real points to two conditions: First, one can 
neither ‘know’ or experience oneself before being, nor can one ‘know’ oneself after 
dying; Second, that there was a ‘before’ without me, and will be an ‘after’ without me, 
is an absolute certainty.   
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 Since finitude is constitutive of being, the seeming externality of this limit is 
actually inscribed in subjective being. The paradox seems insurmountable when one 
considers that ‘external reality’ partially proceeds from the self:  
What we call ‘(external) reality’ constitutes itself by means of a primordial 
act of ‘rejection’: the subject ‘rejects,’ ‘externalizes’ its immanent self-
impediment, the vicious circle of the drive antagonism, into the ‘external’ 
opposition between the demand of its drives and those of the opposed reality. 
(EYS 49, Zizek’s emphases)   
Thus the problem of Stephen’s limits, the temporal beginning and end of things, is 
inscribed in the disjointedness in himself and his external reality. His thoughts regarding 
temporal presence of being echo St. Augustine: “The intention to act is of the present, 
through which the future flows into the past” (U notes p.831). Thus Stephen’s “hold to 
the now, the here, through which all future plunges to the past” (U 178) contains a 
theological kernel, even if viewed askance through a non-conformist Blakean lens. 
 In the next section, I’ll explore Stephen’s drives as they are externalized and 
opposed to historical social reality. The immanent antagonism in Stephen lies in his 
paradoxical position in the shadow of Christianity despite his rejection of Christian 
belief. This traumatic antagonism is externalized in his mother’s demand for him to 
pray with her, and his refusal. This refusal embodies his primordial rejection and 
potentially creates a space for the emptiness of the self, and thus an encounter with the 
Real: “The symbolic order, the universe of the Word, emerges only against the 
background of the experience of this abyss,” an abyss where external reality, which has 
in a temporal sense been the “antagonism of God’s prehistory, [is] resolved when God 
speaks out his Word” (EYS 50). The symbolic order of God’s Word is thus at odds with 
Stephen’s internal drives, his experience of the abyss of self.  
   
4.3  God’s Body and the (M)Other: Subjectivity & the Symbolic  
The Church and the Family are two of the central symbolic structures which Stephen 
rebels against. In the first two sections, I explored the internal impediments constituting 
Stephen’s subjective alienation; here, I’ll look at his symbolic alienation in regard to 
societal structures. Three forms of misrecognition organize the way Stephen structures 
his subjectivity in regard to symbolic structures. This section will examine how he 
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misrecognizes his relationship to the ‘big’ Subject (God), then to other subjects, and 
thus misrecognizes himself as a subject. Stephen’s misrecognitions at subjective 
ontological and symbolic levels lead him to the act by which he cuts free of symbolic 
limitations and confronts the Real.  
 In the initial scene of Ulysses, Malachi Mulligan performs a mock Mass in 
which he interpellates Stephen as “fearful Jesuit” (U 3). Joyce thus illustrates the 
twofold structural antagonism at play: between Mulligan and Stephen, and between 
Stephen and himself. As a peer with access to personal details of Stephen’s life, 
Mulligan knows that Stephen was once set for a life within the Jesuit priesthood yet 
ultimately renounced the Church to follow his calling as a literary artist. He also knows 
that Stephen’s late mother’s dying request was that Stephen would pray with her, which 
Stephen refused. “He kills his mother but he can’t wear grey trousers,” Mulligan 
remarks (U 6). Appropriately, the symbolic field mirrors its inherent ontological 
problem here: “it is commonplace to state that symbolization as such equates to 
symbolic murder: when we speak about a thing, we suspend, place in parentheses, its 
reality” (LA 23). Thus Mulligan’s offhand remark gets at the underlying symbolic death 
of Stephen’s mother, where language kills the life substance of being.  
Hegel’s statements on how understanding breaks up the living organic whole 
and confers autonomous existence on what is effective only as a moment of 
concrete totality are to be read against the background of the fundamental 
Lacanian notion of the signifier qua the power which mortifies/disembodies 
the life substance, ‘dissects’ the body and subordinates it to the constraint of 
the signifying network. Word is murder of a thing, not only in the 
elementary sense of implying its absence—by naming a thing, we treat it as 
absent, as dead, although it is still present—but above all in the sense of its 
radical dissection: the word ‘quarters’ the thing, it tears it out of the 
embedment in its concrete context, it treats its component parts as entities 
with an autonomous existence: we speak about color, form, shape, etc., as if 
they possessed self-sufficient being. The power of understanding consists in 
this capacity to reduce the organic whole of experience to an appendix to the 
‘dead’ symbolic classification” (EYS 51).  
Put simply, the signifier kills the life substance by turning it into a dead symbol. 
Stephen mentally catalogues his mother’s effects, the memories and the material scraps 
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of a life left behind. He broods on this death of his mother and these dead symbols, and 
tries to recognize his mother as an autonomous existence, before symbolization and 
death disembodied her life substance.  
 Mulligan’s remark reveals the manifestation of the excessive objet petit a in 
Stephen: his refusal of his mother’s last wish, to pray with her on her deathbed, is the 
traumatic object in external reality that opposes his inner drive toward freedom from the 
symbolic. A drive toward freedom, though, suggests a precondition of bondage. 
Mulligan prods at this antinomy in Stephen, this non-belief which seems to be 
passionate enough to contain yet a kernel of belief. As he puts it: “you have the cursed 
jesuit strain in you, only it’s injected the wrong way. To me it’s all a mockery and 
beastly” (U 8). Mulligan the medical student chooses his words with care: strain 
connotes a form of virus or bacteria. Stephen is the subject of a ‘sick’ theology, and he 
seeks freedom from the very sickness that has invaded his self.  
 Though Stephen rejects the Church, it has already determined him as a subject. 
In this sense, Christian ideology is an inextricable part of Stephen, whether or not he 
wants it. Stephen is aware of this embeddedness, this sense in which he and his 
associates are ‘always-already-constituted’ by Christian ideology: “Of him that walked 
the waves. Here also over these craven hearts his shadow lies and on the scoffer’s heart 
and lips and on mine” (U 26). Althusser’s line of thought parallels Lacan’s mirror stage, 
by which individuals are hailed as reflections of a primary Other: “the interpellation of 
individuals as subjects presupposes the ‘existence’ of a Unique and central Other 
Subject, in whose Name the religious ideology interpellates all individuals as subjects” 
(Althusser 53). Christian ideology’s central Other Subject is of course God. Human 
subjects are, in Althusser’s words, God’s “mirrors, his reflections. Were not men made 
in the image of God?” (53, Althusser’s emphases).  
 In as much as a mirror reflects something, without actually possessing the 
substance of the reflected object, well: Yes and no, we might say. Stephen’s allusion 
(‘him that walked the waves’) highlights the ontological split by which humans attempt 
to understand immortality and arrive at the Zizekian ‘living dead’: Jesus Christ is said to 
have transcended material limitations during his embodiment or existence (‘him that 
walked the waves’), and is said to (even still) transcend formal limitations during his 
disembodiment or nonexistence (‘over these craven hearts his shadow lies’). This 
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symbolic alienation, represented by Stephen’s (mis)recognition of his mirror image, is 
“an outcome conditioned by the desperate struggle to tame and cope with this 
monstrous, palpitating corps morcele,” the dead symbolic order (Johnston 52). As Zizek 
puts it:  
For a human being to be “dead while alive” is to be colonized by the 
“dead” symbolic order; to be “alive while dead” is to give body to the 
remainder of Life-Substance which has escaped the symbolic 
colonization […] What we are dealing with here is thus the split between 
… the “dead” symbolic order which mortifies the body and the non-
symbolic Life-Substance of jouissance. (Zizek quoted in Johnston, 51) 
What Zizek is getting at here is that the dead symbolic order (and what Stephen 
recognizes in the dead body of Jesus, for example) seeks to both mortify the flesh and 
the will of the flesh. There would be no reason for the Church to mortify the flesh if the 
flesh didn’t also contain something that opposed the saintly virtues; this will of the 
flesh, the basest kernel of the drive to pleasure, is what Zizek calls the non-symbolic 
Life-Substance of jouissance. This ‘enjoyment’ is what one must give up in order to 
signify oneself in The Name of the Father (Lacan’s Nom du Père, thus to include 
oneself in communion with God), yet Stephen refuses to give up enjoyment: jouissance 
is the very life-force that gives creative meaning, that pushes one toward the Real and 
away from the ‘dead substance’ of the Church. Because it involves a rejection of the 
Father, who Stephen’s mother interprets as the giver of life, she considers Stephen to be 
‘alive while dead,’ and fears for his soul.   
 The ontological foundation of the symbolic order of the Church is built upon 
the assertion of this split. Stephen sees this as a failure of the Church, the tautology 
which makes it require sin as it requires itself. “There can be no reconciliation, Stephen 
said, if there has not been a sundering” (U 187). God sundered himself into a 
paradoxically tripartite unity, and sent Christ to sunder upon the material world. Though 
Jesus transcended materiality in walking the waves, he later had to submit to non-
transcendent materiality in order to fulfill the sacrificial function. For Stephen, this is 
problematic: Christianity requires the Fall in order to offer redemption, and the Fall 
seems to include a failure of matter and spirit inscribed within the body of God as 
30 
 
manifested in Jesus. The foundation of anything which seeks wholeness is a primary 
split; Zizek claims this split is inherent to the thing itself.   
 Mulligan semantically inverts this split in the ‘living dead’ body of the Church: 
his half-spoonerism ‘dogsbody’ appears throughout the novel as Stephen appropriates 
the insult in his own contemplative process. Standard liturgy operates on the premise 
whereby wine and wafer are transubstantiated through the authority of the priest into the 
blood and body of Christ, the wafer being referred to as ‘God’s body.’ The believer 
consumes wafer and wine, completing the transubstantiation, as this blood and body of 
Christ renders one’s own body and soul immortal as well. Mulligan’s ‘dark mass’ 
invokes the world rather than God, the fallen state of matter dispossessed of spirit. Thus 
‘dogsbody,’ in its semantic reversal, signifies a reversed or inverted transubstantiation, 
where the subject thus regresses into a primordial, arguably prelapsarian state: assuming 
dogs have no soul, they are simply animate matter dispossessed of transcendental 
subjectivity. When Mulligan hails Stephen as estranged from yet belonging to the 
Church, the term ‘fearful Jesuit’ is intentionally ambiguous – does Stephen have a pious 
and humble fear of God, or does Stephen, despite and as a result of rejecting the faith, 
mortally fear God and fear for his own soul? Mulligan mocks Stephen’s dilemma by 
invoking the marionette-like dog’s body.  
 Stephen’s mother eventually materializes posthumously as an ‘undead’ 
embodiment of this trauma, imploring him to return to the faith. In transcending the 
materialism and life-substance of reality, her (or perhaps, Stephen’s projection of her) 
situatedness within the symbolic fabric of Irish Catholicism creates a double-bind for 
Stephen: he must grapple with this ontological incommensurability, as well as extricate 
himself from the scaffolding of the Symbolic.   
 The death of Stephen’s mother is not so much the primary trauma, as is her 
desire to have him pray, this unconditional demand, which he refuses. Her demand gets 
at the core of Stephen’s self: it is not only that Stephen bless her soul, but that he allow 
his soul to be blessed. In this way, he can join her in the symbolic community, the 
immortal procession of souls heavenward. Zizek argues: “It is precisely for this reason 
that the funeral rite exemplifies symbolization at its purest: through it, the dead are 
inscribed in the text of symbolic tradition, they are assured that, in spite of their death, 
they will continue to live” in the memory of the community (LA 23). Stephen’s mother 
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seeks, for herself and Stephen, to continue to live: not just in the memory of the 
community, family, or Ireland, but in the immortal and infinite register of souls in 
communion with God.  
 This lack of mutuality in last rites leaves a void in the place of symbolic ritual; 
it is this void which haunts Stephen and causes his mother to ‘return from the dead’ to 
haunt him. “The return of the dead is a sign of a disturbance in the symbolic rite, in the 
process of symbolization; the dead return as collectors of some unpaid symbolic debt” 
(LA 23). The final prayer demanded by his mother, the last rites of the Church, is the 
symbolic debt on Stephen’s head. Zizek’s analysis of the ‘living dead’ appropriately 
refers to Lacan’s lesson on the ghost of Hamlet’s father, who returns from the dead to 
‘settle symbolic accounts’.  
 In response to symbolic debt, Stephen’s innermost fears manifest as the excess 
in his self which rails against such subjectification. We can read Stephen via Althusser’s 
duplicate mirror structure of ideology by holding him up to the conditions outlined 
previously in the theory section. I’ve shown that he meets the first two: he is an 
individual interpellated as a subject, and as such, subjected to the Subject (God). The 
final two involve recognition: of the subject’s relationship to (in this case) divine 
Authority, to other subjects in society, and to oneself. In rejecting the Church and his 
mother, Stephen is a ‘bad subject.’ He fails to recognize his subjection and behave 
accordingly, thus he fails to recognize himself. As for the fourth condition, it follows 
that it is not met: “on the condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave 
accordingly, everything will be alright” (Althusser 55). Stephen doesn’t believe that 
‘everything will be alright.’ This very injunction to belief leaves no room for choice, 
thus he isn’t free.  
 According to Althusser, the choice and the lack of choice is an inseparable 
paradox: “there are no subjects except by and for their subjection” (56). Thus we could 
argue that Stephen is both an interpellated subject in this sense and yet not: he is a 
subject insofar as he is already hailed by Christian ideology (among other things), and 
yet he renounces subjection, as he refuses to submit to the big Subject (God) and the big 
Other (Church, Family, Nation). If simply by virtue of existing, Stephen is already 
‘called by his Master’ and has no choice in being a subject, it is this very lack of choice 
that casts the shadow over Stephen’s heart.  
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 Though his path to freedom is constrained by the symbolic systems ingrained in 
him, he wields his knowledge to combat their seeming a priori existence. Stephen won’t 
pray with his mother, and will forever bear the shackles of defiant disbelief, even as it 
fuels his antiheroic artistry. “But in here it is I must kill the priest and the king” he says, 
as he taps his brow (U 548). He has to kill his own consent to subjectification. In this 
way, Stephen pushes to become a subject only for himself, which entails a constant shift 
around the very emptiness at the self’s core. Zizek’s parallax, this “constantly shifting 
perspective between two points between which no synthesis or mediation is possible” 
(PV 4), is the mode of Stephen’s aesthetic: it is the non-position from which he 
enunciates his freedom.  
 Having demanded prayer of him in her final moments, Stephen’s mother 
occupies the shadow-space that Jesus once alone did. The inherent lack in Stephen’s 
own ontological being, doubled by this Jesus/mother shadow, pulls at him like an 
unwieldy carcass, a part of himself he would rather cast off but can’t. In Zizekian terms, 
the kernel of his internal lack externalizes itself in his mother’s demand. This non-
freedom mirrors the ontological limitations of consciousness which prevent one from 
‘grasping’ infinity. In order for Stephen to realize his inner drives to freedom, he must 
confront this traumatic objet petit a in external reality via the Act: a decisive break with 
the symbolic order. Though he has already committed the act of refusal before the novel 
begins, his thoughts and hallucinations ‘return the repressed,’ revealing the act as a 
commitment which demands constant renewal. This perpetual renewal of confrontation 
with the Real arguably drives his creative process of forging into the unknown.  
 
4.4  The Act: Murthering the Irish Language 
Irish terms and phrases are scattered throughout the text of Ulysses, yet among its 
characters, the Irish language is ironically best known by the Englishman, Haines. The 
Irish and the English language compose two of the symbolic worlds Stephen draws 
from while refusing full symbolic allegiance to the one or the other. He has a fraught 
relationship with both: he knows that English is the language of the oppressor, but he 
wields it brilliantly. The very mirror by which we examined his subjectivity so closely 
is tellingly cleft by a crooked crack, a suture in its own material fabric: “It is a symbol 
of Irish art. The cracked lookingglass of a servant,” Stephen says (U 7).  
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 How then can Stephen become independent from this servile, cracked reflection 
of the oppressor while using the oppressor’s language, the oppressor’s symbolic death? 
We’ve observed how the parallax structure of his subjectivity allows him to deconstruct 
the symbolic and material foisted upon the otherwise empty Self:  
What am I? I am neither my body (I have a body, I never “am” my body 
directly […], nor the stable core of my autobiographical narratives that form 
my symbolic identity; what “I am” is the pure One of an empty Self which 
remains the same One throughout the constant change of autobiographical 
narratives. This One is engendered by language: it is neither the Core Self 
nor the autobiographical Self, but what the Core Self is transubstantiated (or 
rather, desubstantialized) into when it is transposed into language. (PV 227) 
The unity of this empty self is thus engendered by language, immaterial yet against the 
‘stable core of symbolic identity.’ Stephen recognizes the externalities that have filled 
the sameness in this empty self: “So I carried the boat of incense then at Clongowes. I 
am another now and yet the same” (U 11). In this way, the symbolic structure of 
language ‘kills’ the subject by desubstantializing the core self, which otherwise resists 
symbolic confines. The parallax of an empty self which both resists symbolic confines 
yet is engendered by language mirrors Stephen’s problem on a superficial level: though 
he hates the oppression England casts upon Ireland, and he recognizes the futility of 
Irish/Gaelic in overcoming linguistic oppression, he also wields the English language 
with immaculate skill and poetry. “In Lacanian terms, the Symbolic is both the 
condition of possibility and impossibility for the subject’s access to the Real” (Johnston 
19).Thus Stephen’s linguistic creation seeks to create a new and living Irish language of 
English, while killing off the dead weight of the old symbolic order.   
 As seen above, Stephen’s refusal is his mode of holding fast to the emptiness of 
the self, ‘tarrying with the negative’ as Zizek would say. He remains in mourning long 
after the standard period has passed. His insistence in looking at this ‘death,’ of himself 
as a subject, and his mother literally and symbolically, is the process by which he 
converts himself into being. “We already know how the negative is converted into 
being: through language as name-giving power, i.e., through the emergence of the 
symbolic order” (EYS 51). The otherwise empty negativity of the self is given 
expression as Stephen breaks with the hegemonic symbolic order and creates his own: 
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this ‘break’ is the very rift from which his new language emerges. Thus a Middle 
English term becomes an ambiguous portmanteau: “Murthering Irish,” Stephen thinks, 
connoting simultaneous creation and destruction: mothering, murdering, an act done to, 
and done by, the Irish (U 192, my emphasis).   
 The dead symbolic classification in Stephen’s case is controlled by England, the 
colonial oppressor. Stephen's critical reaction to this oppression is largely hysteric. 
Though space is “what you damn well have to see” (U 178), we know that Stephen’s 
glasses are broken, and his blurred vision arguably heightens his introspection 
throughout the day. In as much as the impaired orb of Stephen’s eye displaces his 
ability to see clearly, he is able to ‘look awry,’ as Zizek might put it. Brivic claims that a 
skewed, non-rational way of seeing things is the hysteric’s mode of non-compliance 
with the oppressor, who conversely imposes control manifested as obsession (Brivic 63-
80). Obsession uses logic, while hysteria dismantles itself from rational thought and 
proceeds into the unknown.  
 The hysterical response matches Stephen’s very thought process, as the term 
hysteria originates from the archaic medical theory of a travelling womb which would 
dislodge from the torso and travel up to the brain. Stephen’s phrases reflect this motion: 
“Mouth to her womb. Ooomb. Allwombing tomb” (U 47). In this way, Joyce connects 
feminine creativity, the church/state injunction to reproduce, the violence of British 
Imperialism, and the void of death: the assonant ‘ooomb’ repeated four times here acts 
as an umbilical cord linking the orifice of speaking language to the organ of maternal 
creation to the eternal resting place of the material body. Stephen’s gaze is arguably 
‘skewed’ in Circe, where his mother returns from her resting place: “She fixes her 
bluecircled hollow eyesockets on Stephen and opens her toothless mouth uttering a 
silent word” (U 539). Words then, even silent and without breath, have the power to 
connect at both ends of the ontological: to the dead symbolic, the dead matter, to the 
new creation, the life-giving mater.    
  The feminine artefacts that tend to drive Stephen and Bloom’s mental 
processes reveal a close contact with the feminine aspect of creation. This feminine 
drive thwarts the oppression of patriarchal representatives (Britain, Boylan) and opens a 
creative space of negativity for these two characters. These are the lessons which 
Socrates learned from Xanthippe, according to Stephen: “What useful discovery did 
35 
 
Socrates learn from Xanthippe? –Dialectic, Stephen answered: and from his mother how 
to bring thoughts into the world” (U 183). In this view, wives help one parse and 
understand philosophical problems, and mothers help one create. Thus Stephen’s 
‘thought through my eyes’ issues new things from the womb-orb. Stephen’s artistic 
process of pushing into the unknown effectively generates meaning from primordial 
matter, and thus reverses the dead symbolic order’s murder of mat(t)er.  
 When Stephen likens winds to words, he shows both their geographical 
significance and their ability to transport. Winds originally bolstered Britain’s sails, 
bringing the English to colonize Ireland. Stephen dwells upon the English language, the 
ways he has been colonized by it. Accordingly, Shakespeare in Stephen’s Hamlet 
theories becomes “a shadow now, the wind by Elsinore’s rocks or what you will, the 
sea’s voice, a voice heard only in the heart of him who is the substance of his shadow, 
the son consubstantial with the father” (U 189). The symbolic structure of language, as 
a hegemonic claim to knowledge, is thus masculine and tied to the enunciative power of 
the Father.  
 Stephen’s theories on Shakespeare outline this consubstantial insubstantiality. 
They explore the simultaneous death-creation that occurs when ideas reach and resist 
embodiment. This wholly/holy encompassing alpha-omega of existence, antagonistic 
im/materiality is portrayed by “Father, Word, and Holy Breath. […] Hiesos Kristos, 
magician of the beautiful” (U 178). Stephen combines the Holy Father with the mortal 
father, the eternal Word with Shakespeare/Hamlet’s word, and the Holy Ghost with 
mortal breath. Thus the transcendental stuff of thought is linked to material substance, 
and more problematically, to Christian theology. Stephen has trouble determining 
whether Christian thought is thus consubstantial, or insubstantial.  
 Stephen is ‘consubstantial with his insubstantial father,’ as Mulligan taunts, 
both Dedaluses rendered insubstantial (transcending their material subjectivity with 
cognitive functions distilled by aptly named ‘spirits’) to an extent by the predilection to 
drink. The desire to escape consciousness is part of the collective hysteria of Ireland 
unable to deal with Britain’s colonial oppression. This hysteria is visible at the 
subjective level for Stephen, whose blood augmented by alcohol allows him to lose self-
control and enter artistic reverie, to push forward both physically and mentally into 
places and thoughts yet unknown. “The sacred pint alone can unbind the tongue of 
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Dedalus,” claims Mulligan (U 18). The drink may control them economically as a tool 
of imperialist oppression, yet these men voluntarily seek to escape the fantasy of the 
symbolic order via internal loss of control. Thus the voice that Stephen speaks of, at 
once freeing and oppressive, of the insubstantial wind and sea roar, the “voice heard 
only in the heart of him who is the substance of his shadow” (U 178) is arguably 
expressed via the inward effects of alcohol. Zizek claims that the ‘pure’ jouissance of 
mind-altering substances threatens the jouissance of the Other: “What drugs promise is 
a purely autistic jouissance, a jouissance accessible without a detour through the Other 
(of the symbolic order)—jouissance generated not by fantasmatic representations but by 
directly attacking our neuronal pleasure centers” (PV 190). 
 The jouissance of alcohol offers only a different means of fantasy, and is thus a 
problematic solution to the fantasy of the Symbolic. Stephen hasn’t written a great work 
yet, collects a pittance for rather menial jobs, gets drunk and gets knocked down. In 
worldly terms, he is a man of inaction. Paradoxically, his lack of worldly ‘masculine’ 
action allows him the freedom to engage in the hysteric ‘feminine’ act. Action is 
connoted by male activity, the means by which one asserts oneself in the symbolic 
community with the phallic authority to enunciate; whereas the act is an irrevocable 
break with the symbolic order, by which one removes oneself from intersubjective 
symbolic community. Stephen ultimately renounces the patriarchal symbolic Name of 
the Father (effectively the tripartite Simon Dedalus, Leopold Bloom, and the Church) 
by means of the act. Even in following his father as a drunk, Stephen refuses to posit a 
plan of action beyond this ‘no!’, beyond this alienation and loss of self. His renunciation 
of patriarchal authority is what Zizek considers an act:  
The paradigmatic case of such an act is feminine: Antigone’s ‘No!’ to Creon, 
to state power; her act is literally suicidal, she excludes herself from the 
community, whereby she offers nothing new, no positive program—she just 
insists on her unconditional demand. Perhaps we should then risk the 
hypothesis that, according to its inherent logic, the act as real is ‘feminine,’in 
contrast to the ‘masculine’ performative, i.e., the great founding gesture of a 
new order. (EYS 46)  
In rejecting the objectification his mother tries to foist upon him (playing the role of the 
good son, allegiance to family and Church), Stephen’s “empty gesture” (his refusal to 
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pray with her on her deathbed) is the means by which he “freely assumes what is 
imposed upon [him], the real of the death drive” (LA 64). The death drive is not simply 
the desire to break free of the symbolic order and return to protean matter, it is the very 
inhuman excess in us, the subjective jouissance, which paradoxically incites us to live 
beyond our means, beyond the limitations of life and death. Through the act, Stephen 
becomes a subject for himself. By removing symbolic supports which would bolster a 
false ego, he is able to redirect the futility of the gaze of the other back upon himself. 
This subjectification “is the name for the gaze by means of which we confront the utter 
nullity of our narcissistic pretensions” (LA 64). Stephen is beyond the aim to please or 
impress others (“For that are you pining, the bark of their applause?” U 45); his words 
aim rather to destroy and create at the most basic level. He is interested in 
transubstantiating the symbolic dead word into the living act.  
  He confronts the symbolic orders of family and Church by grappling with this 
abyss of time, self, and materiality. The “abyss which separates ‘things’ from ‘words’” 
is much like Hegel’s process as described by Zizek: “For him, the true theoretical 
problem is not how to leap over the abyss which separates acts from words, but how to 
conceive this abyss itself: the absolute act, the act stronger than all interventions in 
reality, is the act by means of which we disjoin the ‘great chain of being’ and acquire 
distance from it” (EYS 54).  
 The freedom Stephen has at the crucial moment of his mother’s death is thus to 
give her nothing, which is something: Stephen’s refusal to pray with her on her 
deathbed is actually the pinnacle of his belief, a parallax deadlock between faith and 
doubt. Mulligan hits the nail on the head with his scathing comment, and that’s why it 
really gets under Stephen’s skin (“you have the cursed Jesuit strain in you, only it’s 
injected the wrong way” U 8). She approaches him with an unconditional demand that 
would lay a claim upon him, and thus objectify him, but counters this with an 
unconditional refusal which essentially removes both her and himself from the equation 
as objects. Stephen’s subjective doubt would make praying an empty gesture. It would 
reinscribe him into the role of son and Catholic and make him inauthentic, supported by 
the network of symbolic fictions. Rather than sacrifice himself for her, he makes the 
infinitely greater move: he sacrifices himself by confronting “the radical negativity 
upon which the [network of symbolic fictions] are founded,” (EYS 53). This 
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renunciation is a true act in the Zizekian sense: “The freedom attained by the act is the 
very opposite of this freedom [gained by a sacrifice which implies the Other as its 
addressee]: by undergoing it, all the burden falls back upon the subject since he 
renounces any support in the Other” (EYS 59). 
 Stephen’s act, his refusal to pray here, his ‘subjective destitution,’ marks his 
break from the symbolic structure. He thus approaches his mother not as an Irish 
citizen, or a Catholic, or even her son, but as an autonomous self who kills the inward 
presupposition of the ‘big Other.’ By refusing to pray, he gives his mother the fullness 
of an act of belief, even though it appears empty. He gives her the parallax of himself: it 
is the ‘nothing’ which really is ‘something,’ and that’s why Stephen chooses it. 
 
 
5.0 Analysis Pt. II 
Leopold Bloom  
 
5.1  Failure and Time: No Roses Without Thorns 
In Lotus Eaters, Bloom anesthetizes himself against the realization of his complicity in 
Molly and Boylan’s rendezvous. Molly has received a letter from Boylan: “Mrs. Marion 
Bloom. His quick heart slowed at once. Bold hand. Mrs. Marion” (U 59). The letter thus 
addresses them both: Molly, rather than Mrs. Leopold Bloom, as was tradition at the 
time; and Bloom, who should recognize his own symbolic effacement therein. Boylan 
sees no obstacle in Bloom as Molly’s husband, and thus inscribes his disregard. 
 Bloom focuses on his letter from Martha, while attempting not to think about 
Boylan’s letter to Molly. Martha’s original message held up against Bloom’s mentally 
transposed message reveals the impasse in communication, the way in which desire 
addresses itself without fully reaching its addressee. Molly’s impending adultery mixes 
with Martha’s details and demands here. In simple terms, Bloom’s own guilt and 
anxiety is mirrored in his interpretation of the letter: 
He tore the flower gravely from its pinhold smelt its almost no smell and 
placed it in his heart pocket. [...] Angry tulips with you darling manflower 
punish your cactus if you don’t please poor forgetmenot how I long violets 
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to dear roses when we soon anemone meet all naughty nightstalk wife 
Martha’s perfume. (U 75)  
Bloom’s ‘manflower’ becomes a cactus here, where his own ‘prick’ of conscience 
doubles as slang for this cactus-phallus.  
 Bloom’s own infidelity, however trivial or imaginary compared to Molly’s, 
disallows him to be upset without being a hypocrite. Molly herself knows of all his 
underhanded dealings, his flirtations, letters and possible infidelities. But amongst these 
angry and unpleasant details, Molly also relates happy memories, for example of their 
courting days: “the day I was in fits of laughing with the giggles I couldn’t stop about 
all my hairpins falling one after another with the mass of hair I had (U 695). The 
hairpins that fail to keep up Molly’s hair remind of the hairpin that binds Martha’s letter 
to Bloom. 
 The image of pins leads Bloom to a musical refrain: “O, Mairy lost the pin of 
her drawers./ She didn’t know what to do/ To keep it up/ To keep it up” (U 76), which 
comically suggests a girl who has trouble keeping her underwear on. The significance of 
the song is compounded by McCoy’s question regarding Molly’s coming musical 
performance with Boylan: “who’s getting it up?” to which Bloom thinks: “Mrs. Marion 
Bloom,” as addressed in her letter from Boylan, “Not up yet” (U 72). ‘She didn’t know 
what to do to keep it up’ plays on the tension between the feminine pins, as well as 
Bloom’s failure of desire and arousal. The hysterical repetition of pins and ‘to keep it 
up’ puts Bloom inside the circular trajectory of his own making: “Lacan defines ‘hero’ 
as the subject who […] fully assumes the consequences of his act, that is to say, who 
does not step aside when the arrow that he shot makes its full circle and flies back at 
him—unlike the rest of us who endeavor to realize our desire without paying the price 
for it” (EYS 14). Thus we begin to see failure at the base of Bloom’s drive: to ‘keep it 
up’ means also to encourage someone to keep doing something, and Bloom is literally 
‘keeping it up’: his extramarital desires, his drive to failure and his allowance for 
Molly’s adultery. 
 Bloom is an antihero who both avoids and takes his own arrow. Though he 
tacitly consents to Molly’s adultery, he represses this agreement by delusional 
investment in desire at the Imaginary and Symbolic levels. The letter Bloom receives 
from Milly contains mention of “Blazes Boylan’s seaside girls,” (U 60), and when 
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asked of her own letter, Molly says that Boylan is coming by with the program, La ci 
darem and Love’s Old Sweet Song. These songs will compose another circulating string 
of refrains throughout Leopold Bloom’s day:  
   All dimpled cheeks and curls,  
   Your head it simply swirls.  
Seaside girls. Torn envelope. […] Friend of the family. Swurls, he says. Pier 
with lamps, summer evening, band,  
   Those girls, those girls,  
   Those lovely seaside girls.  
[…] Will happen, yes. Prevent. Useless: Can’t move. (U 65) 
 Bloom’s paralysis and the repeated songs hint at the repressed guilt and horror he feels: 
“What are symptoms qua ‘returns of the repressed’ if not such slips of the tongue by 
means of which the ‘letter arrives at its destination,’ i.e., by means of which the big 
Other returns to the subject his own message in its true form?” (EYS 14) Bloom’s letter 
to Martha is inscribed in the details of the day, as Molly’s adultery returns Bloom’s own 
message to himself.  
 The circularity of the return of the repressed reveals the libidinal death drive in 
Bloom’s own chase after desire. Bloom has never met Martha, she is simply an 
inscription, an object on paper. “In the case of objet petit a as the object-cause of desire 
we have an object which is originally lost, which coincides with its own loss, which 
emerges as lost; while in the case of objet petit a as the object of drive, the “object” is 
directly loss itself—in the shift from desire to drive, we pass from the lost object to loss 
itself as an object” (PV 62). This movement, and its eventual “push to enact ‘loss’—the 
gap, cut, distance—itself directly” (PV 62, Zizek’s emphasis) serves in a structural view 
of Bloom: he initially seems to chase after lost objects, but as a result of the trauma at 
the start of this day (Boylan’s letter, Molly and Bloom’s tacit agreement to avoid each 
other the rest of the day) we come to see that his desire is in fact a drive, a push to enact 
loss.   
 The Freudian death drive is paradoxically the “name for its very opposite, for 
the way immortality appears within psychoanalysis, for an uncanny excess of life, for an 
‘undead’ urge which persists beyond the (biological) cycle of life and death, of 
generation and corruption” (PV 62, Zizek’s emphasis). Bloom hopes his letter to Martha 
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doesn’t get “chucked in the dead letter office” (U 104) which betrays his fear of the 
failure of an actual exchange, and the impossibility of fully communicating meaning 
inscribed in all communications. His meditation on the cycle of generation and 
corruption leads back to the immediate trauma underlying his shift from desire as object 
to loss as drive, Molly’s adultery with Boylan: “Of course the cells or whatever they are 
go on living. Live for ever practically. Nothing to feed on feed on themselves. But they 
must breed a devil of a lot of maggots. Soil must be simply swirling with them. Your 
head it simply swurls. Those pretty little seaside gurls” (U 105).    
 In this circularity of the libidinal death drive and the potentially live-giving 
productivity of sexuality, mortality makes meaning. Material things transcend their 
materiality into ideological or symbolic meaning in the face of birth and death. “Rusty 
wreaths hung on knobs, garlands of bronzefoil. […] Still, the flowers are more poetical. 
The other gets rather tiresome, never withering. Expresses nothing. Immortelles,” thinks 
Bloom (U 109). So poetics is time-bound, and the aging process bestows meaning upon 
material substance which would otherwise be soulless. A true flower’s lyrical power is 
in its fleeting beauty. The tragedy inherent to mortal temporality means that all things in 
life change, a preferable lot in regard to the changeless permanence of death. This 
highlights Martha’s slip, “I called you naughty boy because I do not like that other 
world. Please tell me what is the real meaning of that word” (U 75). In the first of these 
two sentences, she confuses ‘word’ with ‘world,’ thus rendering the ‘dead’ symbolic 
order of words frightening in its subjective inaccessibility (much like the ‘world’ of 
death).  
 This letter-economy is where we begin to see Bloom’s avoidance as a temporal 
move, where the push for both life and loss is tied to this excess in the death drive, the 
satisfaction of repetition aimed at an impossible fullness, an impossible urge toward 
immortality. Leaving Dignam’s funeral, Bloom thinks of Martha’s letter, and it sends 
his thoughts from death to life: “I do not like that other world she wrote. No more do I. 
Plenty to see and hear and feel yet. Feel live warm beings near you. Let them sleep in 
their maggoty beds. They are not going to get me this innings. Warm beds: warm 
fullblooded life” (U 110). In this case, it hardly matters whose warm bed or who’s in it, 
a sentiment which echoes Molly’s life-affirming ‘Yes’. 
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 The bed and its occupant do matter, though, when the closeness of death 
recedes enough for Bloom to feel the shock of lost time. For Bloom, lost time implies a 
death of part of the self, an end to certain possibilities. Just as Stephen ‘gazed in his own 
omphalos’ while perambulating Sandymount Strand, Bloom imagines his own “bud of 
flesh,” and below it, the “limp father of thousands, a languid floating flower” (U 83). At 
the Lacanian level of the imaginary, his imagined virility is a coping mechanism for the 
excess of his libidinal jouissance: subjectively, ‘father of thousands’ must refer to 
sperm. It cannot mean children, as he refuses a coupling that would produce a single 
child (much less thousands). Time, then, is the primary thorn on Bloom’s rose. It gives, 
but it also takes. Bloom could focus his libidinal energies upon creating another son, but 
too much time has passed. We thus hear the failure in his thoughts: no progeny of 
countless begats, only a ‘darling manflower’ which has become more a cactus, 
betraying the symbolic thorns of his impotence: One thorn his failure to produce a son, 
the other being his complicity now in cuckoldry.  
 
5.2  Life in Death: Productive Avoidance and Necropolitics 
The failure to produce a son is arguably the core trauma behind Bloom’s drive to loss. 
This failure incites shame in Bloom, especially in relation to fathers such as 
Cunningham. “Noisy selfwilled man. Full of his son. He is right. Something to hand on. 
If little Rudy had lived” (U 86). Pages later, the shame is doubled, as he takes 
responsibility for Rudy’s death: “Mistake of nature. If it’s healthy it’s from the mother. 
If not the man” (U 92). Failure here is paternal or masculine, but rather than take 
personal responsibility or try again for a soon, Bloom takes a passive stance of faulting 
nature. The implications of Bloom’s son’s death extend in proportion to his own 
feelings of shame and failure in being a son. His father Virag committed suicide after 
his mother’s death, and Bloom feels guilt and regret for not being more supportive 
during his father’s depression. This is why Bloom looks kindly upon Cunningham, who 
speaks up against the others who condemn suicide as weak and unforgiveable. 
Cunningham knew Virag was a suicide, and arguably feels embarrassed for Bloom. 
Bloom’s compassion for suicides surpasses the necropolitics of the Church which “used 
to drive a stake of wood through his heart in the grave. As if it wasn’t broken already” 
(U 93).  
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 Bloom’s sentiment here underlines the hypocritical message of love proclaimed 
by the Church. Where human authority structures attempt to appropriate transcendence 
by quashing personal freedoms, Bloom wields a strong (though often indirect) intent to 
use materiality to transcend hegemony: Bloom believes in ‘life in the midst of death,’ 
where the state/church apparatus seeks to enforce a necrotic ‘death in the midst of life.’  
 The Church condemns non-productive sexual acts and thus inscribes death in 
the sex drive, the jouissance of sex for the purposes of enjoyment. This was, in A 
Portrait, one of Stephen’s initial gripes with religion: it effectively replaces copulation 
with masturbation, which is still condemned as a sin. Bloom’s inability to cope with 
Rudy’s loss is part of the central trauma underlying his non-productive sex drive. Later 
in the novel, it becomes clear that he has refused to inseminate Molly for over ten years. 
A large part of Bloom’s cuckoldry is in his own libidinal drive, where he chooses to 
‘spill seed’ rather than please Molly: “Ill let him know if thats what he wanted that his 
wife is fucked yes and damn well fucked too up to my neck nearly not by him” (U 729, 
Joyce’s exclusion of punctuation throughout). Stephen jokes about masturbation, 
unwittingly referring to Bloom: “But, gramercy, what of those Godpossibled souls that 
we nightly impossibilize, which is the sin against the Holy Ghost” (U 372). The 
narrative voice in Oxen of the Sun blames Molly’s unhappiness on Bloom: “has he not 
nearer home a seedfield that lies fallow for the want of a ploughshare?” (U 390). 
Bloom’s wastefulness is a pagan sin in the Judeao-Christian view, as the term “rite of 
Onan” reminds us (U 681).  
 In Bloom’s masturbation on the beach, Gerty, whose thoughts and body are of 
course inaccessible, serves as the perfect objet petit a for Bloom’s desire:  
It is that lack at the heart of desire that ensures we continue to desire. To 
come too close to our object of desire threatens to uncover the lack that is, in 
fact, necessary for our desire to persist, so that, ultimately, desire is most 
interested not in fully attaining the object of desire but in keeping our 
distance, thus allowing desire to persist. (Felluga 2011) 
Bloom is compelled by his mental ‘chase’ with both Gerty and Martha because the 
underlying trauma-drive constitutive of subjectivity incites one to continue desiring 
endlessly. Non-reproductive acts allow imagination and fantasy to dominate, and thus 
44 
 
reduce the primacy of the material body, where generation and corruption and 
inextricably bound together.  
 This Symbolic-Imaginary chain links Bloom’s thoughts to the churchyard 
caretaker and his possible sexual relations in graveyards: “they’d kiss alright. Might 
thrill her. Courting death. […] In the midst of death we are in life. Both ends meet” (U 
104). The ‘both ends’ that meet here are arguably the insubstantial yet substance-giving 
imaginary desire, meeting as it were in the flesh: desire leads to reproduction in some 
instances, yet desire as a fantasy isn’t located in the materiality of the body. It’s rather 
located, as mentioned above, in the projected objet petit a, the unattainable lack in our 
being which we project upon others. If Martha and Gerty are the object of Bloom’s 
desire, then Molly’s implicit adultery has become the object of Bloom’s drive. 
 To understand why Bloom’s desire has become a non-productive drive toward 
loss whereby he avoids consummate intercourse with his wife, we have to look at his 
aversion to production. As with Stephen, the traumatic split in Bloom’s Self is rooted in 
the empty core of his being, and expands in regard to temporal and symbolic structures. 
Bloom, who is technically half-Jewish, mentally traces the Judaic lineage from Sodom 
and Gomorrah (connoting illicit sexual practices which anger God) to its apparent 
present death in the Dead Sea, the “grey sunken cunt of the world” (U 59). The very 
orifice that should be productive of life and desire, the vagina, is inverted to death and 
repulsion. Bloom links this obscene sterility to his own horror at the thought of never 
again having this symbolic mother produce desire in him, or a son for him. Thus the 
‘death of the mother’ for Bloom here is twofold. In cutting off both his desire and his 
reproductive chances, the matrilineal yet dead Judaism symbolically castrates Bloom. 
He has lost the phallic authority to enunciate, where ‘enunciating’ would be to inscribe 
a new life into Molly, make her a mother. This failure to ‘speak the word into being’ 
mirrors his erasure of Jewishness on the beach in Nausicaa. 
 Though Bloom has been baptized, he has not taken communion and is perhaps 
more accurately labeled as a “Non-Catholic” (Kenner 71). His position of non-
belonging between Judaism and Catholicism allows him a parallax perspective, an 
outsider stance which is critical of both. Though he is ‘symbolically castrated’ by 
Judaism (amongst other things), he disallows the Catholic Church to wield enunciative 
authority over him. The enforcement of a teleological goal on sex debases its immaterial 
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spirituality. By attempting to colonize sex, which should otherwise transcend 
materiality as an expression of divine love, the Church effectively drains love of its 
potential or inherent good. In psychoanalytical terms: if love is a narcissistic fantasy 
construction on the imaginary level, if marriage is a regulatory construction on the 
symbolic level, and if procreative copulation is a biological drive, the Church fails in its 
attempt to inscribe transcendental love into any sexual relationship. This, as Zizek says, 
is what makes the Church corrupt in view to sex: “It is the Catholic attitude of allowing 
sex only for the goal of procreation that debases it to animal coupling” (PV 249).  
 Bloom finds the corrupt death-substance in both Judaism and Catholicism. 
Father Coffey, whose name reminds of ‘coffin,’ suggests the worm-chewed materiality, 
the death-in-life, of the Church. During Dignam’s funeral, Bloom considers the Mass: 
“Shut your eyes and open your mouth. What? Corpus. Body. Corpse. Good idea the 
Latin. Stupefies them first. Hospice for the dying. They don’t seem to chew it: only 
swallow it down. Rum idea: eating bits of a corpse why the cannibals cotton to it” (U 
77). Cunningham reverses Bloom’s love among the tombstones, in an utterance where 
“in the midst of life” seems to imply an unspoken predicate, there is death (U 93). The 
‘croak’ emitted by Father Coffey even evokes death: the animal croak of the raven, 
mythological messenger of the underworld (which reminds of Stephen’s “reverend 
Carrion Crow,” U 553) and the vernacular verb ‘to croak,’ or to die.  
 Bloom uses his ‘outsider’ position to criticize religion and nation. From the 
position of the oppressed, one who doesn’t entirely belong, Bloom is free to wield his 
shame in a criticism of these ideologies. Even in his defeat, Bloom subverts the 
Church’s phallic authority of enunciating truth. Just as destruction is the other side of 
creation’s Mobius strip, anti-creation is part of Bloom’s productive drive. It allows him 
to let Molly keep creating, to keep her mind and body open to the universe. His 
humanistic acceptance of both Molly’s affair and his own father’s suicide suggest that 
Bloom’s powers for forgiveness extend beyond the limitations of the doctrines of the 
Church, thus undermining their authority. In this way, Bloom is able to gain a critical 
view of these Symbolic structures in which he might otherwise be enmeshed. 
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5.3  Politics of Disgust and the Excrement of Nationalism  
Disgust 
The eating and drinking practices of an average male Dublin citizen reveal Bloom’s 
relationship to materiality, and reveal certain ways in which this community perceives 
him as an outsider. Consider the phrase: “In the midst of death we are in life. Both ends 
meet,” which I have just examined in relation to the necropolitics of the Church. In 
Bloom’s Dublin, the Church and State function as oppressor at the structural level, and 
Boylan as oppressor at the subjective level. Bloom responds to this oppression with 
hysterical aversion to a life that literally feeds on death. 
 By ‘looking awry’ at this phrase, we can examine where both ends (are) meat: 
the reduction of life to material substance echoes Bloom’s musings on the beauty of a 
flower, but with a new perspective. Dead meat, in this case, literally gives life. ‘Eating 
bits of a corpse’ is also part of secular life, as Bloom observes the others in the Burton 
restaurant: “Bitten off more than he can chew. Am I like that? See ourselves as others 
see us” (U 161). His disgust toward the “halfmasticated gristle” and the patron with “no 
teeth to chewchewchew it” is double, where dead meat is as nauseating as decayed teeth 
in a decaying face. Bloom has also ‘bitten off more than he can chew’ in a metaphorical 
sense; thus teeth become part of his hysterical reactions of desire and disgust. Even as 
dead, calcified structures, teeth are connected to the sexual appetites. Molly remembers 
the passion of their courting days: “splendid set of teeth he had made me hungry to look 
at them” (U 698). 
 Bloom fears his and Molly’s mutual loss of desire as he fears the decay in his 
own body. Though he can tolerate and counter the condescension heaped upon him for 
being ‘foreign’ and ‘Jewish’, he cowers at the inevitability of becoming an object of 
others’ corporeal disgust. It’s no surprise that Bloom’s hysteric talisman is a shriveled 
old potato, a gift from his mother said to ward off illness. “Disgust is deeply 
ambivalent, involving desire for, or attraction towards, the very objects that are felt to 
be repellent” (Ahmed 84). The repulsion that Bloom feels in relation to this cycle of 
desire and appetite is yet another instance of the ‘return of the repressed,’ the disgust 
with the self that has landed him in this very productive-avoidance cycle. As mentioned, 
his ‘primordial revulsion’ is connected to the death of his son and father, as well as his 
repulsion (read as avoidance) in relation to Boylan. 
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The contradictory impulses of desire and disgust do not necessarily resolve 
themselves, and they do not take us to the same place. Disgust pulls us away 
from the object, a pulling that feels almost involuntary, as if our bodies were 
thinking for us, on behalf of us. In contrast, desire pulls us towards objects, 
and opens us up to the bodies of others. (Ahmed 84)  
Bloom, unlike Molly, is seen nowhere in the text as fully ‘open to the bodies of others,’ 
thus his disgust arguably overrides his desire. Rather than encounter the body of Gerty 
or Martha, he simply encounters them as projections of his own thoughts. As he 
‘doubles back’ upon himself in this way, his desire becomes mixed with disgust, an 
involuntary peristalsis which mirrors the theme of digestion as well as his doubled-back 
trajectory in the lunchtime Lestrygonians chapter.  
 When Bloom wonders whether Boylan will ‘infect’ Molly, his disgust is 
already inscribed in his stomach: earlier, he relished the urine-tinged kidneys of fowls, 
now, his own inner organs have turned foul as he considers the disintegration of their 
bodily barriers, and Boylan in his place. Stephen’s thoughts echo here: “Dead breaths I 
living breathe, tread dead dust, devour a urinous offal from all dead” (U 49). Ahmed’s 
theory of disgust extends Zizek’s primordial revulsion to a fear of incorporating the 
other: 
The object that makes us sick to the stomach is a substitute for the border 
itself, an act of substitution that protects the subject from all that is ‘not it’ 
[…] it suggests that what makes ‘the not’ insecure is the possibility that what 
is ‘not not’ (what is ‘me’ or ‘us’) can slide into ‘the not,’ a slippage which 
would threaten the ontology of ‘being apart’ from others. (Ahmed 86)  
Thus the Zizekian gap, the split inherent in Bloom’s being, is linked to the ontological 
slippage in disgust, one’s fraught position in relation to others. Bloom’s disgust is tied 
to his conflicted acceptance and rejection of his own extramarital sexual desires which 
must now allow for Molly’s adultery, thus his repressed horror at his own 
insignificance, the end of which is death. Ahmed recognizes the ‘danger’ here of not 
just becoming protean material, but mixing with the protean material of others. By 
confronting the collapse of symbolic structures which support his self, Bloom confronts 
the underlying abyssal Real of existence.  
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Waste/d 
Food gives sustenance, and creates waste. At the bodily level, excrement is something 
one is made to be ashamed of, thus something to cover or get rid of. At the political 
structural level, the waste of the nation is its unwanted body, those citizens who do not 
fit the State-regulated definition of a desirable citizen. These undesirable citizens 
become scapegoats of the State’s own production of waste.  
 The musings of Professor MacHughes reveal the antagonism between 
transcendentalism and materialism inscribed in the imperial compulsion to cleanliness: 
“The Jews in the wilderness and on the mountaintop said: It is meet to be here. Let us 
build and altar to Jehovah. The Roman, like the Englishman who follows in his 
footsteps, brought to every new shore on which he set his foot in his toga and he said: It 
is meet to be here. Let us construct a watercloset” (U 126, Joyce’s emphasis). The 
purpose of religion is to transcend materiality via the altar, which is absurdly surpassed 
by the modern technology of transcending materiality via the ‘throne of alabaster.’ 
 Thus the imperial mission of Church and State is founded upon a different 
‘transubstantiation’: to make invisible that which is material (waste in pipes, hidden 
safely) while wishing to make visible that which is immaterial (spirit, belief). Bloom is 
the non-European who refuses expulsion, thus he is the perfect scapegoat for the others’ 
shame, their symbolic constipation. He is the material embodiment of their own 
shameful waste product, which is the failure of their hegemonic definitions. The 
structure of nation: “A nation? says Bloom. A nation is the same people living in the 
same place” (U 317); and the structure of religion: “Your God was a jew. Christ was a 
jew like me” (U 327). His ‘Jewness’ marks him as a foreign body, potentially 
infectious: “Saint Patrick would want to land again at Ballykinlar and convert us, says 
the citizen, after allowing things like that to contaminate our shores” (U 324). 
 The pub arguably surpasses the Church, in frequency at least, in terms of ritual 
in the symbolic-substantial community of ‘Irish’ men. The guys at the pub spend a good 
deal of time sitting around getting wasted. Bloom rarely shares their company, and 
never gets drunk. When Bloom was at the pub, he avoided drinking, “letting on to be in 
a hell of a hurry. […] There’s a jew for you! All for number one. Cute as a shithouse 
rat” (U 326). Bloom’s failure to meet their requirements places him figuratively in the 
toilet.  
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 As an excremental figure, Bloom reveals the irony of the discursive network 
created by the men, a discourse based on a parallax, a gap in the fabric of the discourse 
itself: the men attempt to “knit a discourse starting precisely from the element that 
escapes the discursive network, that ‘falls out’ from it, that is produced as its 
‘excrement’” (LA 131). This is the discourse of the analyst, which Zizek claims is the 
inverse of that of the master. In this way, the men reveal their own oppressed position, 
though they deny it by bolstering their identities against the outsider who occupies an 
even lower position. 
 On the beach at Sandymount, Stephen observes his surroundings: “A 
porterbottle stood up, stogged to its waist, in the cakey sand dough. A sentinel: isle of 
dreadful thirst” (U 41). Amongst the trash, this bottle up to its waist (a pun on waste?) 
reminds us of Dante’s quest to leave Inferno by climbing the hairy trunk of Satan, who 
stands trapped up to his waist in the ice of Cocytus. The Irishmen are trapped in their 
own sort of hell by drink, as their habitual drinking is one form of colonial oppression. 
Bloom’s voluntary sobriety is puzzling, even threatening, to his contemporaries. They 
sneer at him, using the temperance movement’s slogan sarcastically: “Ireland sober is 
Ireland free” (U 298). The movement may seek Ireland’s independence, but being 
endorsed primarily by women, these men deem it feminine. “It’d be an act of God to 
take a hold of a fellow like of that and throw him in the bloody sea. Justifiable 
homicide, so it would. Then sloping off with his five quid without putting up a pint of 
stuff like a man” (U 323). The hegemonic interpellation of Irishness, especially in 
relation to masculinity, requires that its subjects are fond of drink.  
 Bloom’s position allows him the ironic distance required to see through the 
spectacle of substantial community and ‘traverse the fantasy’ of the Symbolic to 
encounter the Real. The others, caught in a nationalistic pride bolstered by heritage, 
local normative religion, and masculine drinking practices, are thus mired to a greater 
extent than Bloom in the oppression of British rule. He is able to see the fundamental 
lack in these three elements of the substantial community because his gaze is external: 
“those who find themselves within the substance are necessarily blinded” (EYS 55, 
Zizek’s emphasis). Though he is not without scant elements of each (Irish heritage, 
Catholicism, drinking), he fails to fully embody these traits as the others do. “The 
elementary function of the sacrifice is to heal the fissure of the Other. What holds 
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together a ‘substantial’ (‘primordial’) community is its rite of sacrifice, and the position 
of a ‘stranger’ is defined precisely by his refusal to partake in this rite” (EYS 55). Bloom 
refuses to partake in the rites that bond the men in this community, thus he is viewed as 
a stranger and a threat, an excremental receptacle for their hatred and disgust. 
 
5.4 False Historicity and Forced Freedom 
As previously mentioned, Bloom’s deflected desire is the ‘arrow’ he has sent out and 
must now take. We can now see how Molly’s adultery sends this ‘message’ back to 
Bloom in the guise of a forced choice. With Molly, Bloom is part of the symbolic 
community of marriage. In order to accept his own failure and its attendant extramarital 
and non-productive sexual impulses, he is forced to accept Molly’s adultery. The love 
which he professed to the others is essentially the ‘religious’ tool by which he cuts 
himself off from his symbolic relationship to Molly, and chooses “a, the exception, the 
particular object that sticks out from the symbolic order” (EYS 78). As mentioned, 
Martha and Gerty stood in as the objects of his desire, whereas the objet a here is the 
core trauma of his drive toward loss.  
 He must reintegrate this traumatic core as a freely chosen thing. Zizek uses 
Kierkegaard’s ‘leap into the religious’ to outline how a subject accomplishes this 
reintegration by confronting the Real. As such, the stages of repetition for Kierkegaard 
(esthetical, ethical, religious) correspond to the Lacanian system of Imaginary, 
Symbolic, and Real (EYS 78). Kierkegaard’s theory takes the biblical story in which 
God commands Abraham to murder his infant son Isaac. Abraham was prepared to 
commit the non-ethical act of murder, in a ‘leap’ into the religious. In a similar turn, 
Bloom must be prepared to ‘commit’ the non-ethical act of adultery (he facilitates 
Molly’s adultery by staying away from home all day), in a ‘leap’ into the Real. Just as 
Abraham struggled with God’s command to kill his own son Isaac, Bloom struggles 
with making this ‘forced choice’ a freely chosen one. The symbolic structure of family 
(as in Abraham’s dilemma) is difficult for Bloom to overlook, as it gives meaning to so 
much of his past. Rather than examine this familial structure via his memories of Molly 
and their daughter Milly, I want to explore the present, the way he manipulates the 
symbolic structure of time in order to retreat from the possibilities of the day. 
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 Though Molly is still young enough to get pregnant, Bloom refuses the 
possibility and thus relegates this chance to the past. Now, in the present, he is also in 
the process of making Molly’s adultery a thing of the past, fixed and unchangeable. 
Though in possession of the knowledge of Boylan and Molly’s plan, his comment 
“coming events cast their shadows before” betrays a denied complicity with these 
events (U 158). The openness of the present—the fact that he is in the process of being 
cuckolded, and thus has a choice as to what he does about it—is the Real that Bloom 
rails against. He’s like Zizek’s ‘backward-looking prophet’ who does things or lets 
things happen, and then speaks of them as if they were necessary, fated, immovable, 
thus forgetting or denying their moment of becoming. This is what Zizek calls ‘false 
historicity,’ where one reads actions and events on a timeline, rather than in their 
process of becoming. False historicity is an inauthentic stance which allows one to 
relinquish responsibility.   
 Bloom’s oppressors might be very real, but he is not without responsibility. He 
initially inserts himself in a false historicity through repetition at the Imaginary and 
Symbolic levels. Here, his attempt to retain a sense of self despite (self-)victimization 
causes him to act hysterically, a creative and (according to Lacan and Zizek) feminine 
response to oppression. He has a choice, and therefore must freely accept his decision in 
order to confront the Real. In this way, Bloom refuses the trap of the forced choice. By 
embracing his ‘gift’ to Molly, he acts as if he has “always already chosen,” as if he 
knew always that Molly would commit the act and yet that he would love her all the 
same.  
 
The Imaginary and the Symbolic 
Bloom’s seeming engrossment in quotidian details reveals to us his underlying 
compulsive deflection of awareness, which is his true task of the day: to avoid thinking 
of Boylan with Molly, and to appear to others as if everything is normal, as if he is 
unaware of such knowledge. Bloom’s coupling of time with the Imaginary allows him 
to destabilize both from their given parameters: he substantializes time, and he posits 
things missed by subjective sight as nonexistent. In short, time is made firm and ‘real,’ 
while Molly and Boylan having sex is made flimsy and invisible ‘unreal’. He repeats 
Stephen’s sight experiments in a sense: “his lids came down on the lower rims of his 
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irides. Can’t see it. If you imagine it’s there you can almost see it. Can’t see it” (U 159). 
Ironically, this same turn of ‘making invisible’ is euphemized by the pub crew who call 
Bloom’s masculinity into question: “ –Do you call that a man? says the citizen. –I 
wonder did he ever put it out of sight, says Joe. –Well, there were two children born 
anyhow, says Jack Power” (U 323). 
 Bloom’s refusal to accept the realness of an imagined image is a weak positivist 
retreat into the limits of sense-observation. He knows that Molly and Boylan will have 
sex, even though he “can’t see it” literally. Denial only heightens his anxiety, since it 
ontologically turns in upon itself. His thought “Not here. Don’t see him” sounds more 
like an imperative to himself (don’t look at him) than a declarative (I don’t/can’t see 
him). He can close his eyes to the material world, but he can’t avert his eyes from the 
transcendental stuff of thought. In this way, he admits to a certain ‘realness’ in thought 
and imagination. The Imaginary is thus no longer a stable support for his denial, so he 
retreats into the Symbolic structure of time.  
 As Bloom’s sense-experiments lead him to the question of parallax, the falling 
action of his hands matches the descent of the time ball on the city clock. This image 
ties Bloom’s fatalistic temporality to his impotence: “What’s parallax? Show this man 
to the door. Ah. His hand fell again to his side” (U 159). The image of hands as a 
simultaneous instrument of time and sex repeats in reference to Molly and Boylan: 
“Time going on. Hands moving” (U 164). After his fantasy-driven masturbation on the 
beach, he looks at his watch, stopped at half past four, and considers his moment of 
climactic reverie, and thinks of them: “O, he did. Into her. She did. Done” (U 353). 
Having decided that their act is ultimately (like time) unstoppable, he conflates a 
symbol of stopped time with the conclusion of their deed. Just as he stabilized Gerty as 
an object of desire by reducing her to an amalgamation of commodity objects, he 
crystallizes the openness of temporal flow by connecting his stopped watch with the 
concretion of Molly and Bloom’s act.   
 The openness of history confronts us with the burden of freedom, our power of 
choice. In the course of living we make choices; it is only “afterward, when we cast a 
retrospective gaze on it, its course loses the character of ‘becoming’ and appears as the 
manifestation of some ‘eternal’ necessity” (EYS 79). Bloom’s cuckoldry isn’t a 
necessity, but he projects it into the future in order to gaze upon it as done and thus 
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unstoppable. He not only historicizes the act, making it irreversible, he also inscribes his 
own desire into it. They are, in a sense, all climaxing at the same time. In this way, his 
compliance takes the flavor of an act, rather than a passive acceptance; this points to the 
freely made choice whereby he too can break the symbolic injunction to marital fidelity.  
  
The Real 
Bloom seems aware that his resort to false historicity is a failure: “Think you’re 
escaping and run into yourself,” he says (U 360). This is where he realizes the ‘arrow’ 
that he shot has come full circle and stands to receive it. True to Zizek’s line of thought, 
the freedom Bloom gains in his choice allows him to re-encounter himself at the level of 
the Real: “A free Self not only integrates disturbances, it creates them, it explodes any 
given form or stasis. This is the zero-level of the ‘mental’ which Freud called the ‘death 
drive’: the ultimate traumatic Thing the Self encounters is the Self itself” (PV 210). This 
is where Bloom starts breaking through the Imaginary, to the Symbolic, and on to the 
Real. The Imaginary stage gives the impossibility of repetition of the ‘fullness of past 
pleasures.’ One can never truly repeat anything to the same effect, due to the internal 
distance one acquires from a former moment, a former feeling. Thus one moves forward 
to the Symbolic stage, where the acceptance of the impossibility of experience is 
maturely traded for the ‘certitude of repetition.’ “We find satisfaction in the return of 
the Same, like the happy marital couple who has overcome the yearning for exotic 
adventures, yet is still able to avoid melancholic remembrance of past passions” (EYS 
78). But as Zizek explains, the deadlock which pushes us to the next stage  
is of course the experience of how, at this [symbolic] stage too, repetition is 
impossible: the ideal point at which we overcome the futile yearning for the 
New without falling into a nostalgic backward-directed attitude, is never 
present as such. The structure of subjective time is such that, from hopeful 
expectations, from ‘too early,’ we are thrown all of a sudden into 
melancholic remembrance, into ‘too late.’ In other words, the self-referential 
paradox consists in the fact that the ideal point between hope and memory is 
present precisely and only in the mode of hope or memory. (EYS 79, Zizek’s 
emphasis) 
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Bloom’s message of ‘universal love’ repeats his own failure by giving its permission 
further to Molly, giving her the complete sexual satisfaction he’s otherwise denied her 
for over a decade. “Insofar as repetition is not possible, it is possible to repeat this very 
experience of impossibility, i.e., the failure to attend the Object” (EYS 79). This gift 
empties him of things that he considers the opposite of ‘life’ and connects his 
paradoxically Christ-like love with the return of the annual solar cycle: “all are washed 
in the blood of the sun,” which puns on sun and Son (U 592).     
 In repeating the Real, he reestablishes the circularity of time into a sort of spiral 
on which one passes the same place at a similar time each year, and from this same/new 
vantage point, can gain a parallax view of things. “By means of the repetition of the 
past, we undermine this image of history qua the linear process of the unfolding of an 
underlying necessity and unearth its process of becoming” (79). In the abyss of Bloom’s 
traumatic kernel lies the fact that Molly and Boylan’s affair isn’t a necessity, but rather 
an empty space for an event in the process of becoming. Having confronted the Real by 
giving Molly his freely chosen consent, he moves into the void-space that remains in the 
absence of fantasy and the Master-Signifier.  
 
5.5     Bloom The Split Subject: Filling His Own Void 
Zizek claims that “the function of fantasy is precisely to fill in the void of the signifier-
without-signified: that is to say, fantasy is ultimately, at its most elementary, the stuff 
which fills in the void of the Master-Signifier” (PV 373, Zizek’s emphasis). Boylan is 
the Master-Signifier, because he is everything Bloom is not. First, as the counterpart to 
Bloom’s hysteria, Boylan wields the obsessive control of the oppressor. He knows 
where he’s going (to Eccles Street, to sleep with Bloom’s wife), where Bloom’s hysteric 
movement is into the unknown (Bloom is going away from home, with no real plan or 
purpose after the funeral).  
The Master-Signifier is the signifier of potentiality, of potential threat, of a 
threat which, in order to function as such, has to remain potential (just as it is 
also the signifier of potential meaning whose actuality is the void of 
meaning: […] – and as such, it means nothing in particular, it has no 
determinate meaning, it can be articulated only in the guise of a tautology 
[…]). (PV 373)  
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As with indeterminate threats, the very lack of specification is what really does the job, 
“since it invites the power of [Bloom’s] fantasy to fill it in with imagined horrors” (PV 
373). After Bloom fills the day with these imagined horrors, his imagination is given a 
break, and he fills the void with his corporeal substance.  
 Temporality is the medium through which Bloom commodifies and thus ‘makes 
material’ his desire, and the medium by which he affects this parallax shift in relation to 
trauma. The actuality of the ‘threat’ comes only after that threat has passed: having 
returned home, there’s obviously been a strong man there to rearrange the furniture, 
causing Bloom (like Stephen’s Aristotle) to knock the limits of the formal (the 
imaginary, the void of the Master-Signifier) ‘with his sconce.’ Bloom’s entire day has 
been a circuitry of preemptive strikes against the virtual threat of Boylan, a rather ‘real’ 
threat which, more precisely, Bloom wanted to render virtual in his shunting of Boylan-
signifiers onto the various objects and symbolic structures at hand. Bloom, the material 
man said to deal so much with ‘reality,’ wanted a fantasy. Ironically, it was the very 
push toward fantasy which brought reality back around to knock him in the head.  
 When Bloom enters the bed, he does so “with circumspection, as invariably 
when entering an abode (his own or not his own): “with solicitude […] lightly, the less 
to disturb: reverently, the bed of conception and of birth, of consummation of marriage 
and of breach of marriage, of sleep and of death” (U 683). Against a series of 
oppositions, we see that Bloom both belongs to and is estranged from this bed. This 
parallels the simultaneous belonging/alienation inherent in the Self, the parallax gap at 
the core of being.  
 Beside the presence of a human form, female, hers, Bloom encounters “the 
imprint of a human form, male, not his,” the ‘man-shape ineluctable’ which has left the 
outline of its form behind (U 683, & paraphrasing Stephen). Bloom knows quite well 
that Molly has slept with Boylan; but it’s not that he ‘doesn’t want to know,’ rather he 
would ‘prefer not to know.’ There is a knowing, but his activity lies in “the reduction of 
all qualitative differences to a purely formal minimal difference” (PV 382), the act of 
not to know. This is why we find Molly in the bed, and the form there is “hers,” 
whereas the imprint left by Boylan is not “his” (Boylan’s) but “not his” (not Bloom’s). 
In other words, who was there? Not-Bloom. This gesture of “impassive refusal” is a 
withdrawal which creates the negation to open up “a new space outside the hegemonic 
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positon and its negation” (PV 382). He uses this minimal difference to reclaim agency: a 
sort of pure difference between Boylan’s (temporally former) presence in the bed and 
the (present) void of his absence Bloom reduces Boylan to a material thing, thus the 
imprint can’t ‘hurt’ him, and he slides right into its dent.  
 He’s been creating a space for himself all day and night long: to paraphrase 
Zizek, Bloom’s gesture is what remains of the mental energy he’s invested in Boylan 
when Boylan’s place as Master-Signifier is “emptied of all its obscene superego 
content” (PV 382). This is arguably why the binaries listed here make a breach of 
marriage analogous to death: Bloom makes the logical move “from something to 
nothing, from the gap between two ‘somethings’ to the gap that separates a something 
from nothing, from the void of its own place” (PV 382). Just as Bloom effectively 
reduced the Molly-Boylan rendezvous to a material ‘thing,’ a crystallized temporal 
moment and thus robbed it of transcendence, that very materiality is what now allows 
Bloom to create a gap between Boylan’s material presence and absence. We are now in 
a position to observe the overarching structure of this very gap, by looking at the 
original narrative void. 
 Bloom’s side of the story (allowing for such a reductive split) arguably begins 
with his concession to Molly, when he volunteers to remain away from home for the 
remainder of the day. This concession is posited as a negativity, an absence: we are only 
presented with this information at the end, by Molly: “he said he’d be dining out, going 
to the Gaiety” (U 692). The void left by this unspoken detail becomes the ‘traumatic 
kernel’ around which desire circulates. Someone who was otherwise “constantly 
underfoot” (Bloom) and someone who otherwise relates all details of the day’s plans 
(Molly), both have tacitly agreed to avoid each other, and not a word is spoken of these 
awkward arrangements before they are recounted by Molly in Ithaca. After Zizek, we 
can replace the ‘murder’ of a detective story with their tacit ‘agreement’ and get the 
same result: “At the beginning, there is thus the [agreement]—a traumatic shock, an 
event that cannot be integrated into symbolic reality because it appears to interrupt the 
“normal” causal chain” (LA 58). Bloom’s day is thus structured around this non-integral 
trauma, as he vacillates between obsession and hysteria, reality and hallucination, in an 
attempt to ‘re-weave’ the fabric of symbolic reality, like Penelope at her nocturnal 
loom.  
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 The telling of the story would fall flat if Joyce had given Molly and Bloom’s 
dialogue there at the beginning, a point Joycean critics have explored quite thoroughly. 
My reason for revisiting this perhaps well-worn subject is to reveal its implications on 
the level of psychoanalysis, and how it structures the day for Bloom.  
From the moment of this eruption, even the most ordinary events of life 
seem loaded with threatening possibilities; everyday reality becomes a 
nightmarish dream as the “normal” link between cause and effect is 
suspended. This radical opening, this dissolution of symbolic reality, entails 
the transformation of the lawlike succession of events into a kind of ‘lawless 
sequence’ and therefore bears witness to an encounter with the ‘impossible’ 
real, resisting symbolization. Suddenly, ‘everything is possible,’ including 
the impossible. The [protagonist’s] role is precisely to demonstrate how ‘the 
impossible is possible,’ that is to resymbolize the traumatic shock, to 
integrate it into symbolic reality. (LA 58)    
This is why the concrete details of their agreement wait until the end: we need this void, 
in order to travel with Bloom through the fantasy, through his desire and disgust, 
through his shame-exchange as a ‘Jewish merchant’ (even an acquaintance’s reference 
to Shakespeare’s Shylock), through his debasing masochistic hallucinations in Circe, to 
a void into which he can reintegrate himself, and re-establish a symbolic normalcy.  
 By ‘taking his own arrow’ all day, Bloom is able to reinstall himself in the 
position of Boylan, his supreme object of agony, his Master-Signifier, and thus enjoy 
having pleasured Molly without having done it himself. “The immense pleasure brought 
about by the […] solution results from this libidinal gain, from a kind of surplus profit 
obtained from it: our desire is realized and we do not even have to pay the price for it” 
(LA 59). Once again, Stephen’s theories and remarks inadvertently comment on 
Bloom’s situation: “The sentimentalist is he who would enjoy a thing without incurring 
the immense debt of its enjoyment” (U 392). In facilitating Molly’s enjoyment, Bloom 
discharges himself of the guilt of his drive toward loss, and is thus able to fully enjoy 
his failure. This is not to suggest that Bloom hasn’t paid any sort of price for his freely 
chosen sacrifice, but that the debt inscribed in Bloom’s trauma has been there all along, 
since the trauma of Rudy’s death, and could essentially not compound in regard to 
Molly’s actions. “No later undoing will undo the first undoing. [says Stephen...] A like 
fate awaits him and the two rages commingle in a whirlpool” (U 188). These two 
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traumas are the Scylla and Charybdis which Bloom has navigated all day, on a path 
whose temporal spiral trajectory allows him to re-encounter the same emptiness in 
himself from a new vantage point by means of the parallax. His symptom/sinthome has 
pointed to this revelation throughout the day: the sirens of the ‘seaside girls’ call to 
Bloom, tied like Odysseus tied to mast in his heart between two roaring worlds where 
they swurrrrl. 
 
 
6.1 Conclusion  
In the introductory section entitled ‘Structure of the Analysis,’ I outlined the key points 
of each subsection of the analysis. Rather than recapitulate those points here, I’d like to 
conclude by examining certain instances where Stephen and Bloom seemingly repeat or 
refer to one another, in a comparative analysis which focuses on similarities rather than 
differences. Here, Joyce’s parallax is an overarching ontological structure that ranges 
from internal psychology and molecular movements, to the philosophy of our 
connections with each other and the world, to the astronomical implications of humans 
in relation to the positions of stars, universal cycles, and time. 
 
 
Unholy Water  
Heusel claims that Stephen and Bloom’s points of view are “subtly superimposed until 
the urination scene in which literal convergence of their creations, water, foreshadows a 
fuller vision of life” (Heusel 135). Though I do agree that Joyce’s work reveals a fuller 
vision of life, and that this water-making certainly illustrates the flux of life, of 
consciousness and language, matter, and relationships, I disagree with the claim that the 
convergence of urine here is what finally foreshadows this fuller vision. Though Bloom 
and Stephen do merge in a sense, the question of a lasting connection is open-ended, 
and we might easily assume their water, as well as their relationship, bifurcates and 
disintegrates. Like time, the flow is away. Duality installs the pair into a complete 
circuit, where I argue that an impasse remains which disallows completion. Only the 
tension between their perspectives remains, while no real union is achieved.  
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 My analysis departs from Heusel to assert that discordance is what allows these 
two anti-heroes to assert their creative powers and invest meetings and moments with 
meaning, even as underlying trauma causes them to move around and away from central 
desires which resist attainment. If anything, this scene uses the ‘unholy’ water - the 
secular (Bloom’s) and the blasphemous (Stephen’s), waste liquid (urine) rather than 
generative liquid (semen) - that best illustrates failure as goal and achievement, and 
illustrates relationships between subjects sundered from even themselves, people who 
fail to achieve full unity within themselves or with others.  
 This needn’t be a depressing view: we can still enjoy our attempts, our creation, 
despite the ultimate failure of connection and the unattainable ideal of home. As I’ve 
explained via Zizek, this ‘enjoyment,’ the pleasure-in-pain of jouissance, is the very 
substance of life, and the only thing we truly have. Stephen and Bloom’s closest link to 
each other resembles the inherent parallax gap in being itself, thus where Stephen and 
Bloom meet is in this “purely nonsubstantial link between individuals” (PV 80).  
 Rather than reinforce literature’s normative quest, an attempt at reunification 
and thus a closed circle, Stephen and Bloom quest against themselves. This process of 
creation, rather than going straight-on for its mark, deflects and resists attainment, and 
in this way sustains itself. This is arguably why Joyce’s writing sustains endless 
rereading, as its very process both creates and mirrors the psyche of its characters.  
 
A Keyless Existence 
That Bloom finds himself keyless upon arrival to Eccles Street forces him to confront 
the stark difference between yesterday and today. His keys are in yesterday’s trousers. 
Rather than Blazes sneaking in or out through the window, it’s Bloom who’s forced to 
do so. He is a burglar in his own home, which perhaps points to the human condition: 
being ‘locked out’ from the abyss of our beginning, we attempt to force our way ‘in,’ 
only to find that ‘in’ is an Imaginary/Symbolic attempt at comfort, and the ‘Real’ is the 
antagonistic feeling of not being completely ‘home.’ Ironically, Bloom’s entire day is 
spent talking about the ‘crossed keys’ in the ad for Keyes in his pocket, while unaware 
that he’s crossed himself by forgetting his keys at home. Stephen has “lost” his keys as 
well – he symbolically refuses the oppressions of Haines and Mulligan, and thus gives 
up his keys to the Martello Tower.   
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 Stephen does not expect to find any “finally discovered conceptual true home”; 
as Zizek says, “we remain forever split, condemned to a fragile position between the 
two dimensions, and to a ‘leap of faith’ without any guarantee.” Thus Stephen’s ‘new 
home’ is “homelessness itself, the very open movement of negativity” (PV 9, Zizek’s 
emphasis). This open movement is literal and figurative, and embodies the quest of 
creative becoming via loss and failure. The “conceptual true home” arguably arises as a 
need left unmet by the traditional home, and as such is an extension of the same 
oppressive system from which Stephen seeks to free himself. Bloom would be another 
symbolic father, thus Stephen has to resist him. If the object of desire is actually 
fantasmatic, Stephen ‘traverses the fantasy’ by rejecting Bloom’s offer. To accept 
would be to materialize the Real, to concretize his drives into known coordinates, which 
would arrest the continuous movement into the unknown. Failure runs the drives of both 
characters because it allows them to keep desiring. Their goal can be failure, 
homelessness, “but the true aim is the endless continuation of this circulation of such” 
(PV 61).  
 
Upon the Incertitude of the Void 
Stephen vacillates ‘between two roaring worlds’ while not inhabiting either: his act 
destroys the narcissistic projection of Self, while also destroying the symbolic order 
which would support it. Thus he gains contact with the void of being: 
the act qua real, transgression of a symbolic limit, does not enable us to 
(re)establish a kind of immediate contact with the presymbolic life substance, it 
throws us, on the contrary, back into that abyss of the Real out of which our 
symbolic reality emerged. (EYS 54)  
Stephen proclaims the abyss of God’s creation as the abyss of fatherhood, the mystery 
which the patriarchal Church has suppressed. “Fatherhood, in the sense of conscious 
begetting, is unknown to man.[…] On that mystery and not on the Madonna which the 
cunning Italian intellect flung to the mob of Europe the church is founded and founded 
irremovably because founded, like the world, macro and microcosm, upon the void. 
Upon incertitude, upon unlikelihood” (U 199). He recognizes the negative space 
between positions at the cellular, microstructural level: “As we, or mother Dana, weave 
and unweave our bodies, Stephen said, from day to day, molecules shuttled to and fro, 
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so does the artist weave and unweave his image” (U 186). This constant motion extends 
from the molecular level to temporality, allowing for a parallax view: “So in the future, 
the sister of the past, I may see myself as I sit here now but by reflection from that 
which then I shall be” (U 187). Bloom encounters himself in this same way: “No longer 
is Leopold, as he sits there, ruminating, chewing the cud of reminiscence, that staid 
agent of publicity and holder of a modest substance in the funds. He is young Leopold, 
as in a retrospective arrangement, a mirror within a mirror (hey, presto!), he beholdeth 
himself” (U 393). The theme of mirrors and time points to the way mis/recognition at 
the basis of the formation of subjectivity is enabled by constant movement through 
space and time, allowing one a parallax view of oneself.  
 The internal gap(s) caused by the constant movement of bodies is arguably the 
very space where Stephen and Bloom ‘meet.’ Though their trajectories are different, 
their paths constitute the obverse of one another, two sides of the same Moebius strip, 
entwined yet never fully meeting. In Stephen’s case: “He affirmed his significance as a 
conscious rational animal proceeding syllogistically from the known to the unknown 
and a conscious rational reagent between a micro and macrocosm ineluctably 
constructed upon the incertitude of the void” (U 650). In Bloom’s case: “That as a 
competent keyless citizen he had proceeded energetically from the unknown to the 
known through the incertitude of the void” (U 650). A syllogism is the philosophical 
logic by which two general statements lead to a more particular statement. Thus the 
syllogistic procession of the two ‘general’ positions of Stephen and Bloom’ reveal the 
particularity, the exceptionality, of universality. Through imperfect repetition, an act 
which confronts the Real, each character achieves a spiral-circularity which breaks free 
of the Imaginary-Symbolic attempt at exact sameness in repetition.     
 
Ecco, Echo 
Joyce seems to suggest that the world bounces one back to oneself, sonically and 
spiritually. To echo thus is to be human, to repeat imperfectly is part of the subjective 
and universal cycle, a temporo-spatial metastructure for humanity:  
Interval which. Is the greatest possible elipse. Consistent with. The ultimate 
return. The octave. Which. […] What went forth to the ends of the world to 
traverse not itself, God, the sun, Shakespeare, a commercial traveler, having 
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itself traversed in reality itself becomes that self. Wait a moment. Wait a 
second. Damn that fellow’s noise in the street. Self which it itself was 
ineluctably preconditioned to become. Ecco!” (U 475, Joyce’s emphasis).  
‘Ecco’ is Latin for ‘behold’; thus, as in an act of creation (i.e. “behold, I will cause 
breath to enter you, and you shall live,” Ezekiel 37:1) Stephen speaks the interval and 
the return into being. This encounter of the Self is not unlike Bloom’s ‘a mirror within a 
mirror, he beholdeth himself.’. The noise of speaking the Self into being creates an echo 
of itself, of course: thus Stephen’s ‘Ecco!’ literally shouts what it is to ‘be human’, Ecce 
Homo.  
 Stephen’s ‘learned speech’ here also reminds of Bloom’s earlier lamentation, 
with its echoed call and answer:  
A low incipient note sweet banshee murmured: all. A thrush. A throstle. His 
breath, birdsweet, good teeth he’s proud of, fluted with plaintive woe. Is lost. 
Rich sound. Two notes in one there. Blackbird I heard in the hawthorn 
valley. Taking my motives he twined and turned them. All most too new call 
is lost in all. Echo. How sweet the answer. How is that done? All lost now. 
Mournful he whistled. Fall, surrender, lost. (U 261)  
The ‘too new call’ ties the effort of creation with destruction (‘lost in all’). These two 
notes in one (“The ultimate return. The octave.”), taken, twined, and turned, create the 
echo, the parallax between call and answer. Having examined the correspondence of 
Kierkegaard’s repetition (esthetical, ethical, religious) and Lacan’s cycle (Imaginary, 
Symbolic, Real), the tripartite movement here concludes with the abyss that one 
encounters as a result of the ‘leap’ to the Real. Bloom’s free choice matches Stephen’s 
act, as they both surrender the false supports of the Imaginary and Symbolic.  
 Joyce, like Stephen (or Stephen, like Joyce) shares the ‘jesuit curse, injected the 
wrong way,’ thus many of the themes in Ulysses have a background in Christian 
thought, though Joyce pushes them to new conclusions. Zizek explains how the logic of 
the minimal difference of parallax was first introduced in the Christian narrative:  
Not only—as the cliché would have it—is universality based in an 
exception; Lacan goes a step further: universality is its exception, it ‘appears 
as such’ in its exception. This is […] the ‘supernumerary’ element: the 
exception (the element with no place in the structure) which immediately 
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stands for the universal dimension. […] Christ, the miserable outcast, is man 
as such (ecce homo). (PV 39, Zizek’s emphases).  
True to the paradoxical incommensurability in Stephen, Christianity injected the wrong 
way, Joyce frames universality by the exceptionality of his characters. Thus the 
Christian narrative is pushed to its Joycean conclusion: Contrary to the fall, surrender, 
and resurrection of the Christian narrative, whereby one is ‘redeemed’ or reinstated in 
perfect unity (a complete circle), this fall and surrender leave one lost: to volley in the 
parallax interval between positions, the very movement of which creates the eternal 
return, the continuous trajectory of discovery.  
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 A Final Note on Limitations and Future Work 
 
My purpose has been to examine the parallax gaps in the subjectivity of Stephen and 
Bloom, and to explore the antagonistic desires and drives that arise in result. My 
argument centers upon the proposition of the parallax gap as the driving force in these 
two characters. For this reason, I’ve singled out one traumatic event for each character, 
and shown how it ‘cracks’ the fabric of being for this character, so to speak. The fault 
lines extend from an inherent gap at the minimal level of being out to larger structural 
entities, exerting a negative pull on the internal drives and external trajectories of these 
characters.  
 Limiting my work to this theoretical scope (along with the spatial limitations of 
the thesis) has also limited my ability to explore a number of topics here in depth. For 
example, though I demonstrate masculinity as a product and requirement of Irish 
nationalism, and mention its paradoxical ties to alcohol (arguably an instrument of 
British imperialism), I don’t explore the problematic cases in which Bloom responds to 
racism with racism. These themes are eloquently explored by Joseph Valente in a 
chapter in Semicolonial Joyce, entitled: ‘Neither fish nor flesh’; or how ‘Cyclops’ stages 
the double-bind of Irish manhood.’ This double-bind arguably demonstrates a parallax 
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social antagonism, and would certainly contribute to my purpose. Throughout this 
thesis, I’ve explored the failure of interpersonal connection that attends desires and 
drives. This phenomenon is similar to the ‘failed communion’ which Hélène Cixous 
posits in The Exile of James Joyce. It is also illustrated superbly in a piece entitled Joyce 
the Post, which reads the postal service as a metonym for Lacanian desire in Ulysses 
and Finnegan’s Wake.  
 Finally, a more thorough immersion in psychoanalysis and phenomenology via 
Zizek, Lacan, Hegel and others could certainly add to my considerations here. Given 
more time and space, I would have explored the relation of Bloom ‘filling his own void’ 
to the ontological question of God using humanity to fill his own void. This is what 
Zizek means by calling humanity ‘divine excrement.’ Stephen’s own considerations of 
the paradox in theology, that God’s Fall and Redemption via man and Jesus is self-
requiring, a sort of ontological tautology, points to further explorative possibilities.  
 Expanding the delimitations of my hypothesis to test these and other materials 
could be the focus of further research or doctoral studies. While I have only skimmed 
the surface of possibilities, I have attempted to thoroughly demonstrate the usefulness of 
Zizek’s theoretical body in illuminating the drives of Stephen and Bloom and crucial 
themes in Ulysses.  
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